EN BANC
G.R. No. 259337 [Formerly UDK No. 17329], November 25, 2025
VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC. AND NIXON BANIBANE, PETITIONERS,
vs.
RICARDO V. YANSON, JR., RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, S.A.J.:
I concur with the ponencia's adoption of our colleagues' comments during deliberations, which refined the understanding of fugitive disentitlement in our jurisdiction based on our laws, rules, and context.
The petition before this Court questions the propriety of suspending a criminal prosecution for grave coercion in view of a prejudicial question in a pending intra-corporate dispute. The petition further questions whether or not the respondent Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. possesses standing to seek affirmative relief from the courts given his alleged status as a fugitive from justice.1
I commend the ponente's discussion of fugitive disentitlement in the context of analogous principles found in our jurisdiction. I respectfully submit that the American common law's hold on our legal order is subject to our own law and our own rules. American common law has no intrinsic authority in our jurisdiction unless, to us, it makes sense. Thus, a person's specific circumstances, their applicable constitutional rights, and our jurisdiction's policies on maintaining judicial authority and economy should form part of the calculus in determining whether such a person has lost their standing before the courts. There may be valid reasons for a person to leave the country while a criminal prosecution against them is pending but willful evasion of criminal prosecution or subsequent punishment may result in the loss of recourse before the courts. As such, I offer this opinion to aid in developing our own standards for when a person may be deemed a fugitive from justice.
However, I maintain that the pending intra-corporate dispute in Commercial Case No. 19-118 determines an essential element of grave coercion and, thus, creates a prejudicial question that should have suspended the criminal prosecution against respondent in Criminal Case No. 20-07- 34724.
I
I disagree with the ponencia's finding that there is no prejudicial question in Commercial Case No. 19-118. Rule 111, Section 7 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates its elements, as follows:
RULE 111
Prosecution of Civil Action
. . . .
SECTION 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied)
JM Dominguez v. Liclican,2 which the ponencia cited as basis to deny the application of the rule on prejudicial questions, clarified the same rule, as follows:
As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.3 (Citations omitted)
Thus, JM Dominguez ruled that an intra-corporate dispute, which sought to determine which set of corporate officers had the "authority to commence and prosecute" the criminal cases, raised a prejudicial question that should have suspended the criminal proceedings in question:
Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No. 6623-R, the intracorporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case No. 6623-R involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMD's meetings, election and acts of its directors and officers. among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between the two contesting group of officers should rightfully be seated at the company's helm. Without Civil Case No. 6623-R's resolution, petitioners' authority to commence and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R against respondents for qualified theft in JMD's behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the criminal proceedings.4 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Here, the intra-corporate determines an essential element of grave coercion—"that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right."5
In Timoner v. People,6 this Court acquitted the accused of a charge of grave coercion because it found that the accused's acts were executed under lawful authority.
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per se. . . .
. . . .
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right or wrong." The three elements of grave coercion are: 1 that any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2 that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and 3 that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right.
The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion7 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Concurrently, the resolution of Commercial Case No. 19-118 would determine the third element of grave coercion—whether the allegedly criminal acts were done with lawful authority, as it involves the respondent's authority to act as a corporate officer in taking control of corporate property.(awÞhi( The intra-corporate dispute's resolution, therefore, involves an issue intimately related to the charge of grave coercion, which, once resolved, may determine whether the subsequently instituted criminal action may proceed.
The ponencia cites the Resolution issued by the Court's Second Division on April 15, 2024 in G.R. No. 271961 entitled Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr., v. People of the Philippines and Nixon A. Banibane, in support of its conclusion that the intra-coiporate dispute questioning the validity of the July 7, 2019 Special Board Meeting did not raise an issue that would affect the possible findings in Criminal Case No. 20-07-34724 for grave coercion.8
However, the crime charged in G.R. No. 271961 involved an alleged violation of Section 19(a) in relation to Section 24 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, which requires proof of elements entirely different from the charge of grave coercion.
Manzanal v. Ausejo9 clarifies the nature of Section 19(a) of the Public Service Act, which if violated may cause penal sanctions under Section 24 of the same law. This case involved the revocation of a taxicab service's certificate of public service after a passenger was robbed while onboard the vehicle.
Section 19(a) of the Public Service Act contemplates of failure to provide a service that is safe, proper or adequate and refusal to render any service which can reasonably be demanded and furnished. It refers specifically to the operator's inability to provide reliable vehicles to transport the riding public to their places of destination and to the failure to provide an adequate number of units authorized under his franchise at all times to secure the public of sustained service. While the words "unsafe, inadequate and improper " may be broad enough to cover a lot of things, they must be interpreted in consonance with the purpose of the Public Service Law, which was specifically enacted, among other things, to protect the public against unreasonable charges and poor inefficient service and to secure adequate sustained service for the public at the least possible costs.10 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Going into matters of proof, Manzanal clarified which management or operational matters, if established by evidence, may qualify as violations of Section 19(a):
The facts of the case are bereft and wanting of any evidence to the effect that petitioner rendered a service that is unsafe, inadequate and improper. There was no testimony whatsoever that her vehicles are of such kind which may endanger the lives of the passengers or are not suitable for the peculiar characteristics of the area serviced. There is no proof that petitioner is not in a position to cope with the obligations and responsibilities of the service and to maintain a complete number of units as authorized. While we agree with respondent Commission that said provision does not necessarily require a "passenger-operator" relationship, We disagree that a single hold-up incident which does not clearly link petitioner's taxicab can be comprehended within its meaning.11 (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 271961, the intra-corporate dispute posed no prejudicial question to the alleged violation of the Public Service Act because the issue of whether or not the respondent was a validly elected corporate officer was wholly unrelated to the resolution of whether or not the public service was operated in an "unsafe, improper, or inadequate" manner. Moreover, the petition in G.R. No. 271961 was denied through a minute resolution, which establishes no precedent with respect to the prejudicial nature of the same intra-corporate dispute. In contrast, the intra-corporate dispute's finding on the validity of the July 7, 2019 Special Board Meeting determines whether or not the respondent had a lawful right to relocate Vallacar Transit, Inc.'s buses to the Dynamic Builders and Construction compound. Thus, the intracorporate dispute determines an essential element of the crime of grave coercion and must necessarily suspend the criminal proceedings pending its resolution.
II
I agree with the ponencia's discussion of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, as framed by our jurisdiction's Rules of Criminal Procedure and relevant jurisprudence. Fugitive disentitlement is a common law doctrine by which a court may "decline to entertain the claims of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice."12 United States common law developed this principle as one of equity,13 which allows a court to effectively enforce its powers and fulfill its functions despite a person's efforts to evade them.14 The ponencia aptly discussed the purposes sought by fugitive disentitlement, as follows:
In the present, the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is determined by examining four key factors, namely: (1) assuring the enforceability of a decision against the fugitive; (2) not allowing a fugitive to utilize the resources of the court when he or she has flouted the judicial system; (3) discouraging escape and encouraging voluntary surrender; and (4) avoiding prejudice to the other side or the Government caused by the fugitive's escape or extended absence.15
Further, common law operationalizes the fugitive disentitlement doctrine's application through a two-step process of determining: (1) the defendant's fugitive status; and (2) the extent to which disentitlement would uphold the doctrine's purposes.16
The pursuit of upholding judicial authority and respect for legal processes is not unique to common law. Rather, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine's emergence from the need "to ensure orderly and efficient judicial procedure"17 shares common objectives with our jurisdiction's efforts to ensure that parties seeking relief from the courts may be held to account for the consequences of such a recourse.
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine was originally designed to ensure orderly and efficient judicial procedure. In applying the doctrine, some courts focus on the fugitive's defiance of the legal system and on the delay caused by his escape. However, the supervisory capacity of the federal courts to apply the doctrine is necessarily limited in scope. Because it is grounded in a court's power to control its docket and its proceedings, when a court invokes the doctrine, the fugitive's status must be somehow related to the ongoing proceedings. If the fugitive's status does not have the requisite "connection"—i.e., it neither affects the court's ability to carry out its judicial business nor prejudices the government as a litigant—the claim may not be dismissed.
The critical question is "what disruption, if any, the fugitive's absence has on the integrity of the sanctioning court's own processes. "18 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Ultimately, fugitive disentitlement addresses a party litigant's actions that impact the integrity of the court's processes and its institutional stability.19 The ponencia's adoption of this concept admirably seeks to bolster judicial authority over those who would seek to reap the benefits of legal remedies while insulating themselves from adverse outcomes. I join in the ponencia's reference to our rules and jurisprudence, which show that our legal institutions are sufficiently equipped to hold fugitives accountable without having to resort to foreign precedent.
People v. Prades20 defined a "fugitive from justice" using language similar to the fugitive disentitlement concept, as understood in common law:
Flight is the evasion of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest, detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. It is considered an indication of guilt. A "fugitive from justice, " on the other hand, is one who flees after conviction to avoid punishment, as well as one who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution. By his flight and thereafter becoming a fugitive, appellant waived his right to adduce evidence and consequently denied himself the opportunity to dispute the charge against him.21 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Concurrently, I join the ponencia's reference to Rule 124, Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows our courts to decline a claim of relief made by a person who is essentially a fugitive from justice.22
SECTION 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. — The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Usares v. People,23 citing People v. Mapalao,24 further applied Rule 124, Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in a manner consistent with the common law concept of fugitive disentitlement.
Under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, the CA is authorized to dismiss an appeal, whether upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, once it is determined that the appellant, among others, jumps bail[.]
. . . .
The reason behind this provision is not difficult to discern. Same as one who escapes from prison or confinement, or flees to a foreign country, an accused-appellant who jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal is considered to have evaded the established judicial processes to ensure his proper criminal prosecution, and in so doing, forfeits his right to pursue an appeal. In People v. Mapalao, the Court explained that:
The reason for this rule is x x x once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement x x x, he should not be afforded the right to appeal therefrom x x x. While at large as above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in court.
In this relation, it should be pointed out that the right to appeal is merely a statutory remedy and that the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly follow the requirements therefor. As the Court discerns, Section 8, Rule 124 evokes an implicit requirement for an appellant to duly observe prevailing criminal processes pending appeal, else, he runs the risk of, among others, having the same dismissed.25 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The doctrine's applicability to appellate reliefs sought by one who "escapes prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country"26 reflects considerations found in common law. Further, the ponencia's reference to Labao, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,27 and Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections,28 it becomes apparent that a person's "intent to evade prosecution or punishment" is a crucial factor for determining when a person may be deemed a fugitive from justice.29
I agree with this analysis of fugitive disentitlement, as it exists in our jurisdiction. I further add that several other provisions must be read together with Rule 124, Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in order to fully appreciate the scope of authority given to our courts in pursuing the same goals sought by fugitive disentitlement.
RULE 114
Bail
SECTION 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
SECTION 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
. . . .
(c.) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia;. . .
. . . .
RULE 115
Rights of Accused
SECTION 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
. . . .
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel.
. . . .
RULE 120
Judgment
. . . .
SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading if in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state Ihe reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.30 (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provisions illustrate the avenues by which courts may deal with a party litigant's compliance with required procedures in a criminal prosecution. Clearly, the enumerated rules, while non-exclusive, encompass proceedings before, during, and after a criminal prosecution, as part of the comprehensive guarantee of the accused's rights. As correctly discussed by the ponencia, however, these rights must be read together with the State's right to due process.31' In illustrating the importance of these processes, the ponencia aptly summarized the four instances when an accused is required to physically appear before the courts:
In fact, under the rules, there are only a number of specific instances when the physical presence of an accused is required. First, as discussed above, the physical presence of an accused is required for the courts to act on applications for bail. Second, even if out on bail, the presence of an accused is required when specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. Third, the accused must personally appear during his or her arraignment. Fourth, the accused must be present during the promulgation of judgment32 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, I submit that an accused's failure to appear physically before the court when required by law, our rules, or by order from the judge illustrates their "intent to evade prosecution or punishment."33 Concurrently, I agree with the ponencia's formulation of our jurisdiction's process for stripping fugitives of their recourse to our legal processes, as follows:
For all these reasons, an accused is generally considered a fugitive from justice when the accused fails to appear physically before the court when required by law, our rules, or by order from the judge. More specifically, the person who flees from the Philippines with knowledge that an Information was filed against them in court and a warrant of arrest is issued, demonstrates a clear intent to evade arrest and prosecution, and renders such a person a fugitive from justice. They may then be disentitled to any judicial relief.34
Here, respondent's failure and continued refusal to appear during the trial incidents that required his personal appearance may be considered as proof of their intent to evade prosecution and subsequent criminal liability. In my opinion, these instances of required personal appearance before the court are facets of the right to due process. The accused's disregard of these procedural requirements, without valid justification, shows their intent to evade prosecution and subsequent criminal liability.
The foregoing analysis, as reflected in the ponencia, is consistent with a holistic appreciation of our current laws and rules. The ponencia's discussion provides a better understanding of our jurisdiction's conception of fugitive disentitlement, insofar as it pursues its goal of maintaining our courts' institutional integrity and respect for their judicial authority, while also according the necessary respect for due process considerations.
Our jurisdiction's rules and legal principles provide that a fugitive from justice may lose their right to affirmative relief from our courts when they show clear intent to flout our legal processes.35 The ponencia's discussion of the country's current difficulties in prosecuting those who would flee in anticipation of criminal prosecution is well taken.36 However, an accused may similarly flee because of political persecution, fear for their personal safety, or some other manifestation of the power imbalances in our society. Careful distinctions must be made and balanced with the specific circumstances of each case or else we run the risk of denying a litigant's access to relief in a case where their absence from our jurisdiction may be justified.
The common goal of all court procedures remains the strengthening of judicial efficiency, respect for judicial authority, and integrity of court processes. Thus, I caution against facilitating the denial of relief in a manner that would be insensitive to the possibility of our legal processes being used to serve political and often purely personal ends, and to otherwise perpetuate the power gap between the elite and the marginalized. The right of the accused to be presumed innocent,37 and all of its concomitant rights,38 must therefore take precedence in any determination of a person's status that would result in the forfeiture of their constitutionally protected rights. Thus, I commend the ponencia's remand of these proceedings to the lower court for the proper determination of respondent's status and standing.39
The ponencia explains that applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine "will also promote equal protection of the laws" as guaranteed by the Constitution.40 Provincial Bus Operators Association v. Department of Labor41 discusses the scope of this guarantee:
"Equal protection of the laws" requires that "all persons ... be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. " "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities."
However, the clause does not prevent the legislature from enacting laws making valid classifications. Classification is "the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars." To be valid, the classification must be: first, based on "substantial distinctions which make real differences"; second, it must be "germane to the purposes of the law"; third, it must "not be limited to existing conditions only"; and fourth, it must apply to each member of the class.42 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Santos v. People,43 citing Himagan v. People,44 further discusses the equal protection guarantee's goal of eliminating "discrimination and oppression based on inequality":
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.45 (Emphasis supplied)
However, as discussed above, our jurisdiction already has adequate measures for protecting the integrity of judicial processes while also respecting the rights of party litigants. The ponencia itself recognizes that the Rules of Court provide for remedies that achieve the same goals of fugitive disentitlement, though not explicitly adopting identical nomenclature or legal context found in common law.46
The ponencia further reasons that by upholding the ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao,47 the Court has allowed fugitives from justice to seek affirmative judicial reliefs while deliberately evading arrest.48 Thus, fugitive disentitlement should operate to preclude the respondent from seeking affirmative reliefs from the court unless the court acquires custody over their person.49
I agree only to the extent that the ruling in Miranda must maintain the distinction between the effects of a person's surrender to the custody of the law and their submission to the court's jurisdiction, as a matter of due process.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law.
. . . .
In fine. as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before Us taking and not after.50(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Respect for due process is intrinsic to court efforts in enforcing its judicial authority and has emerged as a point of contention in attempts to expand the scope of fugitive disentitlement in the United States.
Another underlying rationale for the disentitlement doctrine consistently cited by the Coutf is the desire io protect the court 's dignity and to engender respect. When a criminal appellant disappears while his appeal is pending, he flouts the authority of both the trial court and the court adjudicating his appeal. . . .
. . . .
Even if one accepts the motion that the fugitive's conduct constitutes an affront to the forfeiture court, there remains less severe alternatives to disentitlement. Indiscriminate application of the doctrine as punishment for any misconduct is extreme: "[I]t is a greater slain on our jurisprudence for the court. . . to discard those procedures that safeguard right and fair decision." As Justice Kennedy noted in Degen, the judicial system earns respect and dignity not through oppressive implementation of its rules, but through fair and considered judgment on the merits of any claim.51 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, the distinction made in Miranda continues to serve a valid purpose and need not be abandoned. While I agree that an exception for fugitives should be made in order to implement the ponencia's ruling on when and how to deal with fugitives from justice, there remain valid reasons to allow a person to submit to the court's jurisdiction, or otherwise invoke its special jurisdiction, while not yet under custody. I respectfully submit that our current rules, which necessarily include the rule laid down in Miranda, remain capable of addressing the ponencia's concern over fugitives abusing our legal processes.
In evolving jurisprudence, we should constantly review and, in the appropriate case, articulate the philosophical and policy foundations of our doctrinal interpretations. We should also be sensitive to the social impact that our past declarations have had on the unique culture, political economy, and societies that we have. If we are to do justice, we often should chart a separate path from the common law of our former colonizers. We are a pluralistic society, still with numerous legal transplants that are a residue of our colonial past. I commend the ponente and my colleagues for showing the way forward to a more egalitarian review of common law doctrine.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the Petition.
Footnotes
1 Ponencia, pp. 9 -10.
2 765 Phil. 262 (2015) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division]
3 Id. at 271-272.
4 Id. at 272.
5 Alejandro v. Bernas, 672 Phil. 698, 708 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division],
6 211 Phil. 166 (1983) [Per J. Escolin. Second Division],
7 Id. at 169-170.
8 Ponencia, p. 13.
9 247 Phil. 35 (1988) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division].
10 Id. at 43.
11 Id.
12 United States v. Bescond, 24 F,4th 759, 764 (2d Cir. 2021)
13 United Slates v. $40,877.59 in United States Currency, 32 F.3d 1151,1152 (7th Cir. 1994).
14 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United Stales, 507 U.S. 234,239-240 (1993)
15 Ponencia. p. 25.
16 United States v. Bescond, 24 F.4th 127, at 771 (2nd Cir, 2021)
17 Martha B. Stolley, Sword or Shield: Due Process and the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 751, 778 (1997).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 355 Phil. 150 (1998) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
21 Id. at 164-165.
22 Ponencia, p. 25.
23 845 Phil. 339 (2019) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division],
24 247 Phil. 354 (1991) [Per J. Gancayo, En Banc].
25 Usares v. People, 845 Phil. 339, 344-345 (2019) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division],
26 Id. at 345.
27 790 Phil. 348 (2016) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
28 328 Phil. 624 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, En Banc].
29 Ponencia, pp. 21-22.
30 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 114 sees. 1-2 Rule 115, see. 1; Rule 120, see. 6.
31 Ponencia, p. 27.
32 Id. at 19.
33 Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections, 328 Phil. 624, 642 (1996) [Per J. Francisco. En Banc].
34 Ponencia, p. 29.
35 Usares v. People, 845 Phil. 339, 345 (2019) [Per J. Ferlas-Bernahe, Second Division]; citing People v. Mapalao, 247 Phil. 354, 363 (1991) [Per J. Gancayo, En Banc]-, See also Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 114, 115, and 120.
36 Ponencia, p. 28.
37 CONST., art. III, see 14.
38 CONST., art. III, sees. 15-22.
39 Ponencia, p. 31.
40 Id. at 28.
41 836 Phil. 205 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]
42 Id. at 277.
43 585 Phil. 337 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
44 307 Phil. 555 (1994) [Per J. Kapunan En Banc].
45 Santos v. People, 585 Phil. 337, 362 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario. Third Division].
46 Ponencia, p. 26.
47 520 Phil. 907 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
48 Ponencia, p. 20.
49 Id. at 20-21.
50 Miranda v. Tuliao, 520 Phil. 907, 921-913 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
51 Martha B. Stolley, Sword or Shield Due Process and the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 751, 779-780 (1997)
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