EN BANC
G.R. No. 259337 [Formerly UDK No. 17329], November 25, 2025
VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC. AND NIXON BANIBANE, PETITIONERS,
vs.
RICARDO V. YANSON, JR., RESPONDENT.
DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The ponencia grants the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Petition) filed by petitioners Vallacar Transit, Inc. (VTI) and Nixon A. Banibane (Nixon) and reverses and sets aside the Orders dated March 1, 2021 and August 12, 2021 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City (RTC Branch 45) which held in abeyance the criminal case against Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. (Ricardo) for Grave Coercion due to a pending prejudicial question before the commercial court.1 The ponencia further orders the remand of the criminal case against Ricardo to the court of origin, specifically, Branch 7 of the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Bacolod City (MTCC) for the application of the new procedure provided by the Court before declaring an accused, who flees from Philippine jurisdiction, a fugitive from justice. By doing so, the ponencia redefines a "fugitive from justice" and extends to such person the application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine as adopted in Rule 124, Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A fugitive from justice was first defined by the Court in Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections2 as a person who flees after conviction to avoid punishment or who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution.3 The ponencia calibrates this definition and clarifies that a fugitive from justice includes a person who flees from the Philippines after an information is filed in court and a warrant of arrest is issued and demonstrates a clear intent to evade arrest and prosecution. Such person must have the knowledge that an information against him has already been filed and that a warrant of arrest has been issued. This knowledge may be established through: (1) actual notice, such as personal receipt of the information, or (2) constructive notice, such as when there are clear, public, and documented efforts by law enforcement to serve legal process, even if personal service was evaded or unsuccessful.
Foremost, in light of recent events, specifically the anomalies and corruption in the government's flood control projects, and the flight from the Philippines of certain personalities seeking to evade prosecution for their involvement therein, it may indeed be high time for the Court to reconsider the current jurisprudential definition of a fugitive. Accordingly, I agree with the ponencia's redefinition of fugitive from justice. Further, the proposed remand of the case and the procedure I provided during deliberations, which the ponencia adopts in full, is an added measure of safeguarding constitutional rights to due process of an accused.
That said, I dissent on the sole ground that the Petition filed by VTI and Nixon should be denied on the ground that the intra-corporate cases between the Yanson siblings pose a prejudicial question to the present case for Grave Coercion.
Essentially, the intra-corporate cases relate to the change in leadership of the VTI Board of Directors. Thus, the Grave Coercion case against Ricardo whose alleged criminal act pertains to his functions as a board member and Vice-President for Maintenance of VTI, is intertwined with the resolution of the intra-corporate cases.
To recall, the present case stems from a dispute over VTI, a family- owned corporation, particularly between two factions of the Yanson family. The first group is composed of Ricardo and his other siblings Roy V. Yanson (Roy), Celina Yanson-Lopez and Emily V. Yanson (collectively, Yanson 4) while the second group consists of their younger brother Leo Rey V. Yanson (Leo Rey), sister Ginette Y. Dumancas, and their mother, Olivia V. Yanson. The Yanson siblings are all directors/officers of VTI. Initially, Leo Rey was the President of VTI, but he was eventually voted out in a Special Board Meeting (SBM) held on July 7, 2019 by the Board of Directors due to unexplained company expenses. Roy was then designated as the new VTI President while Ricardo held the position of Vice-President for Maintenance. The Yanson 4 took over the VTI head office and obtained possession of 55 VTI buses which were then transferred to Ricardo's compound.4
On July 12, 2019, Leo Rey filed an intra-corporate case against the Yanson 4, asking for the nullification of the July 7, 2019 SBM. The case was docketed as Commercial Case No. 19-118 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City (RTC Branch 53). While the case was pending, Leo Rey attempted to retrieve the buses from Ricardo's compound and was finally able to do so on August 9, 2019, with the help of law enforcement personnel.5
A few days thereafter, Leo Rey was able to reclaim his position as President through a Special Stockholders' Meeting (SSM). The Yanson 4 filed a Petition for Nullification of the SSM which was docketed as Commercial Case No. 19-122 and raffled to the RTC Branch 45.6
Meanwhile, after the SSM, Leo Rey issued a Secretary's Certificate dated August 28, 2019 authorizing the filing of criminal actions against the Yanson 4. Later, a Complaint-Affidavit was filed before the Office of the Prosecutor of Bacolod City (OCP) against the Yanson 4 for Carnapping, violation of the Public Service Act and Grave Coercion.7
However, as early as March 7, 2020, Ricardo already left the Philippines. He executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun of Fortun Narvasa & Salazar (FNS) to represent him in all proceedings before any court in the Philippines.8
Later, in a Resolution dated June 8, 2020, the OCP found probable cause against Ricardo for the crime of Grave Coercion.9 Consequently, on June 9,2020, an Information10 for Grave Coercion was filed against him. FNS filed an Urgent Motion with Alternative Prayer to Suspend Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Arrest Warrant (Motion to Suspend Proceedings).11
The MTCC initially granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to the prejudicial question posed by the intra-corporate cases, but later modified its order finding that no prejudicial question existed. After denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, FNS filed a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC Branch 45.12 The RTC Branch 45 issued an Order which annulled and set aside the MTCC Orders. The RTC Branch 45 also ordered that the criminal case be held in abeyance pending resolution of the prejudicial question before the commercial court.13 Hence, the present Petition filed by VTI and Nixon.
It is from the above factual backdrop that it can easily be seen that Commercial Case Nos. 19-118 and 19-122 pending before the RTC Branch 53 and RTC Branch 45, respectively, pose a prejudicial question to the present criminal case for Grave Coercion. Thus, for this reason alone, the Court should deny the Petition.
The rules relating to prejudicial questions are found in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
Section 6. Suspension by Reason of Prejudicial Question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (5a)
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.14 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.15
The ponencia determines that the intra-corporate cases do not pose a prejudicial question to the criminal case for Grave Coercion because the question of who the legitimate members of VTI's Board of Directors does not have any relation to any of the elements of Grave Coercion.
I disagree. Section 7 of Rule 111 merely requires that the previously instituted action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, the resolution of such determines whether or not the criminal case should proceed.
In the case of People v. Arambulo, et al.,16 the Court was tasked to determine whether an intra-corporate case posed a prejudicial question to a criminal case for Estafa. The case involved Anaped Estate, Inc. (Anaped), which was incorporated as part of the estate planning of Pedro C. Reyes (Pedro). Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice President of Anaped, filed a Complaint for Estafa against Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), an heir of Pedro, and her husband claiming that they failed to remit rentals collected from the time ownership of commercial apartments owned by Pedro were transferred to Anaped. In due time, an Information against Victoria and other respondents were filed. Victoria filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of two intra-corporate cases. Victoria, along with two brothers, claimed that she filed a petition questioning the authority of their elder sibling and the Anaped Board of Directors, including Buban, to act on behalf of the corporation. When the case reached the Court, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals' (CA) finding that a prejudicial question existed. The Complaint pending with the Securities and Exchange Commission prayed for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban.(awÞhi( Essentially, the question in the intra-corporate case was the authority of the said officers to act for and on behalf of the corporation. Meanwhile, the criminal case pertained to whether Victoria and the other respondents committed Estafa, the elements of which included misappropriation of money by the offender and demand by the offended party. Such elements bore relevance to the validity or invalidity of the authority of Anaped directors and officers. Since the alleged offended party is the corporation in this case, the validity of the demand for the delivery rests upon the authority of the person making such demand for the company. If the supposed authority of the person making the demand is found wanting, it is as if no demand was made, hence the prosecution for Estafa could not prosper.127 Thus, should Victoria prevail in the intra-corporate case, then Buban, who does not own either by himself or in behalf of Anaped, the property managed by Victoria, cannot demand remittance of the rentals on the apartments and Victoria does not have the obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban.18
Another case in point is JM Dominguez Agronomics Co., Inc., et al. v. Liclican, et al,19 In the said case, the Court found that the intra-corporate dispute between two sets of officers and directors of the corporation presented a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by one faction against the other. To elaborate, the first set of officers and directors, who were newly appointed through an annual stockholders meeting, instituted a Complaint for nullification of meetings, election, and acts of directors and officers before the regional trial court (RTC) against a second set of officers and directors who claimed to have been duly elected by the stockholders of the corporation. The first faction then filed a criminal case for Qualified Theft against two officers of the second faction, claiming that the two officers, without authority, withdrew substantial amounts from the corporation's bank account. Later, Informations for Qualified Theft against the two officers were filed before the RTC which eventually found probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In due time, the two officers filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA to annul and set aside the Orders of the RTC due to the prejudicial question posed by the intra-corporate case between the parties. The CA granted the Petition for Certiorari. Upon further review by the Court, the Court affirmed the CA's finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the arrest of the two officers despite the existence of a prejudicial question, viz.:
As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No. 6623-R, the intracorporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case No. 6623-R involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMD's meetings, election and acts of its directors and officers, among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between the two contesting group of officers should rightfully be seated at the company's helm. Without Civil Case No. 6623-R's resolution, petitioners' authority to commence and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R against respondents for qualified theft in JMD's behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
Judge Tiongson-Tabora cannot deny knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6623-R as the judge presiding over its JDR. As correctly held by the CA:
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said prejudicial question that should have barred the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the simple reason that a juridical person can only act through its officers, and the issue in the main case submitted for JDR before Judge Tiongson-Tabora is one for nullification of meetings, election and act of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs. Thus, she knows for a fact that there is a question as to who are the legitimate directors of JMD such that there is doubt as to whether private respondents are in a position to act for JMD. . . .
Verily, the RTC ought to have suspended the proceedings, instead of issuing the challenged Orders issued by the RTC.20 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Similarly, the present case involves two intra-corporate disputes between two sets of officers of VTI. The first intra-corporate dispute was filed by Leo Rey seeking to nullify the July 7, 2019 SBM which changed the composition of VTI's Board of Directors by removing Leo Rey as President and instituting the Yanson 4 as officers of the corporation, with Ricardo as the new Vice President for Maintenance. Meanwhile, the second intra-corporate dispute was filed by the Yanson 4 seeking to nullify the SSM which re-elected Leo Rey as President. The seizure of the 55 VTI buses were done when the Yanson 4, including Ricardo, were part of the Board of Directors and officers of VTI. It would appear then that Ricardo had the authority to refuse the surrender of the VTI buses to Leo Rey, who was no longer VTI President. Since the Information for Grave Coercion against Ricardo hinges on his lack of authority to possess the buses, the intra-corporate cases pose a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Thus, if the present criminal case is allowed to proceed alongside the two intra-corporate cases, and later, the commercial courts determine that the July 7, 2019 SBM instituting the Yanson 4 as valid, then necessarily, the criminal case for Grave Coercion should be dismissed, as Ricardo was acting within his powers in seizing the 55 VTI buses and withholding their return to Leo Rey. Clearly then, the issue of which set of siblings is the duly constituted Board of Directors and officers of VTI is intimately connected to the issue raised in the criminal case for Grave Coercion. The resolution of the intracorporate cases is determinative of the guilt or innocence of Ricardo because if he is found to be a director and the duly appointed officer of VTI, he was exercising a lawful right on behalf of VTI when he prevented Leo Rey from taking possession of the 55 VTI buses. One of the essential elements to prove the crime of grave coercion would be missing (i.e., that the accused who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right).21
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Petition should already be denied, and the determination of whether Ricardo is a fugitive would not be necessary.
FOR THESE REASONS, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Vallacar Transit, Inc. and Nixon A. Banibane.
Footnotes
1 Ponencia, pp. 1-2.
2 328 Phil. 624 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, En Banc].
3 Id. at 642.
4 Ponencia, pp. 2—3
5 Id. at 3.
6 Id. at 4.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 6-7.
9 Id. at 4.
10 Id. at 5. The Information reads:
That on or about 08 to 09 August 2019 in Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above names accused, President of Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phils.) and having general supervision, control and management of the day to day affairs of the said corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prevented and failed to release or turn-over the fifty-five (55) buses parked inside the premises of the corporation to Vallacar Transit, Inc. or its duly authorized representatives when demand was made upon him, thereby depriving or preventing the latter of its gainful and lawful use of the same from 08 August to 09 August 2019 by means of blocking the main gate of the said premises with two (2) dump trucks, said accused in doing so, has no lawful right whatsoever or authority of law and justifiable cause.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Citation omitted)
11 Id.
12 Id. at 7.
13 Id. at 8.
14 Sabandal v. Hon. Tongco, 419 Phil. 13, 17 (2001) [Per J. Pardo, First Division],
15 Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, et al., 609 Phil. 245, 251 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division],
16 760 Phil. 754 (2015) [Per J. Perez, First Division].
17 Id. at 763.
18 Id. at 765.
19 765 Phil. 262 (2015) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
20 Id. at 271-272.
21 The elements of Grave Coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: 1) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and 3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. Alejandro, et al. v. Atty. Bernas, et al., 672 Phil. 698, 708 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
