Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-25-035 [Formerly JIB FPI No. 25-035-MTJ], March 04, 2025
ANONYMOUS, COMPLAINANT,
vs.
HON. JULIETO N. BAJAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 2, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, SURIGAO CITY, SURIGAO DEL NORTE, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
ROSARIO, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 filed by the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) of the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) against retired Hon. Julieto N. Bajan (Judge Bajan), former Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Surigao City, Surigao del Norte, charging him with violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, circulars; violation of reasonable office rules and regulations under the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
The Antecedents
The instant Complaint was prompted by two undated anonymous letter-complaints received by the Office of the Chief Justice and the Office of the Executive Judge of the MTCC Surigao City, Surigao del Norte.(awÞhi( Both complainants explained that they are litigants in cases pending before Judge Bajan and are purposely concealing their identities out of fear of reprisal.2 The first anonymous complainant3 averred that he or she was a party in a civil case pending in Judge Bajan's sala, whose disposition was delayed by the latter's conduct. Allegedly, trial would begin at 11:30 in the morning instead of 8:30, and parties would have to wait for more than two hours just for it to be later postponed.4 Moreover, Judge Bajan would smoke and sleep during trial; and heard cases in his sala in Surigao City although they were raffled to MTCC of Placer-Bacuag, Surigao del Norte.5 The second anonymous complainant6 echoed the allegations in the first anonymous complaint. Additionally, Judge Bajan was accused of failing to act on other court matters in a timely manner.7
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the first anonymous complaint to Executive Judge Victor A. Canoy, Regional Trial Court of Surigao City (RTC EJ Canoy) for the conduct of a discreet investigation and report.8 Meanwhile, the second anonymous complaint was referred to Executive Judge Cesar P. Bordalba, MTCC of Surigao City, Surigao del Norte (MTCC EJ Bordalba).9
In their respective Reports, RTC EJ Canoy and MTCC EJ Bordalba confirmed the allegations against Judge Bajan after verification from relevant court personnel, litigants, and lawyers. Their findings are summarized as follows:
1) Tardiness – He arrives late and conducts hearings between 11:00 and 11:30 in the morning until about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon:
2) Smoking – He smokes in open court while holding hearings from the time he took over as Acting Presiding Judge MTCC, Branch 2 until November 2012. However, until now, he still smokes inside the judge's chambers.
3) Absences – He does not report to his regular court daily when he has no schedules in other courts; and
4) He sleeps during a court trial and the lawyers had to leave him as a consequence.
5) On delays in acting on court matters no apparent or serious delays were found considering that Judge Bajan is only an Acting Presiding Judge and holds hearings two days in a week.
6) It was confirmed that Judge Bajan had heard at MTCC Branch 2, Surigao City one case from Placer-Bacuag and one case from Sison Tagana-an.10
The OCA referred the second anonymous complaint to Judge Bajan for comment within 10 days from receipt.11
In his letter-comment12 dated February 28, 2014, Judge Bajan requested the OCA to dismiss the second anonymous complaint, arguing that it was a mere harassment suit intended to damage his reputation. Notably, he focused on the alleged procedural flaws of the complaint–such as its lack of verification and supporting public records–rather than addressing its substance.13
The OCA, in a letter14 dated May 2, 2014, required Judge Bajan to submit a more comprehensive comment instead of brushing it aside as a mere harassment suit. Records reveal that Judge Bajan failed to comply with this directive twice.15 In a letter16 dated February 1, 2021, the OCA reiterated its directive requiring the filing of a more comprehensive comment. However, such directive was not complied with.
On July 14, 2021, the OCA referred the first and second anonymous complaints to the OGC for appropriate action.17 Recognizing the validity of the findings from the investigations, the OGC recommended that Judge Bajan be found liable for the following offenses:
1. Violation of OCA Circular Nos. 63-200118 and 09-2015;19
2. [Violations] of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 200920 and Office Order No. 06-200921 which [constitute] a Violation of Reasonable office Rules and Regulations under Rule 10, Section 50 (F) (2) of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
3. Violation of OCA Circular No. 90-2004 and Article VIII, Section [5(4)] of the 1987 Constitution; and
4. Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.22
In its 1st Indorsement23 dated May 10, 2022, the JIB directed Judge Bajan to file a verified comment within 10 days.
On March 9, 2023, the JIB directed Judge Bajan to file his verified comment on the OGC's Complaint and show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Philippine Bar. He was cautioned that failure to comply with this directive would constitute a waiver to participate in the proceedings. This notwithstanding, Judge Bajan failed to comply.24
Recommendation of the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB)
In its Report and Recommendation,25 the Office of the Executive Director (OED) of the JIB recommended:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Board that the instant matter be REDOCKETED and the following be recommended to the Supreme Court:
1. Respondent Presiding Judge Julieto N. Bajan, Branch 2, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte, be found GUILTY of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and accordingly FINED the total amount of [PHP] 18,000.00, payable within a period not exceeding [three] months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated; and
2. Respondent Judge Bajan be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and [be] FINED the total amount of [PHP] 18,000.00, payable within a period not exceeding [three] months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated; and
3. Respondent Judge be found GUILTY as member of the Philippine Bar for violations of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 11, [Rules]
11.02 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he be FINED in the amount of [PHP] 5,000.00.26
In its Report,27 the JIB made the following recommendations:
ACCORDINGLY, we respectfully RECOMMEND to the Honorable Supreme Court that the instant case be RE-DOCKETED as regular administrative matter and that retired Judge Julieto N. Bajan, Branch 2, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte be found GUILTY of:
1. Habitual absenteeism and[/]or tardiness and be FINED in the sum of [PHP] 50,000.00, payable within a period not exceeding [three] months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated;
2. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives and Circulars for smoking during court hearings and be FINED in the sum of [PHP] 50,000.00, payable within a period not exceeding [three] months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated;
3. Simple misconduct for sleeping during court hearings and accordingly be FINED in the sum of [PHP] 50,000.00, payable within a period not exceeding [three] months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated;
4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives and Circulars for hearing cases not raffled to his sala and be FINED also in the sum of [PHP] 50,000.00 payable within a period not exceeding [three] months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated;
5. Simple neglect of duty in the performance of official functions for delay in resolving cases and incidents and be FINED in the sum of [PHP] 50,000.00, payable within a period not exceeding [three] months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated; and
6. As a member of the Philippine Bar, respondent be found GUILTY of simple misconduct and be FINED the sum of [PHP] 50,000.00, payable within a period not exceeding [three] months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated.28
The Issue
The issue posed for resolution is whether Judge Bajan should be held administratively liable for the charges against him and for the same acts, be sanctioned as a member of the Philippine Bar.
The Court's Ruling
The Court partly adopts the findings of the JIB in its Report, with modifications insofar as the offenses committed and the penalties imposed are concerned.
At the outset, it bears pointing out that that despite Judge Bajan's retirement on May 23, 2023, the Court retains jurisdiction to declare him either innocent or guilty of the charges against him; and to impose upon him the proper penalties.29 Expounding further on the matter, the Court in Office of the Court Administrator v. Fuensalida30 held:
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case. In fine, cessation from office by reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case filed against the said officer or employee at the time that he [or she] was still in the public service or render it moot and academic.31 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the separation of Judge Bajan from office by reason of his retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint initiated while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic.32
As will be further discussed below, Judge Bajan is found guilty of the following less serious charges under A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC or the "Further Amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court" (Revised Rule 140): violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars; habitual tardiness; and simple misconduct constituting a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Additionally, he is guilty of the serious charge of gross insubordination under the same rule.
Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars
Section 15(e) of Revised Rule 140 classifies the violation of Supreme· Court rules, directives, and circulars that establish an internal policy, rule or procedure, or protocol as a less serious charge.
Based on the evidence on record, Judge Bajan is liable for two separate violations of the Court's circulars on smoking and on the prohibition of hearing cases from other courts.
The Court's policy on smoking is embodied in Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008 and Office Order No. 06-2009. Memorandum No. 01-2008 enjoins "all officials and employees of the Judiciary to strictly observe the prohibition against smoking in the buildings of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and in all Halls of Justices." Likewise, Office Order No. 06-2009 prohibits smoking in all interior areas of the buildings of the courts and the areas immediately adjacent to these buildings. Thus, smoking is allowed within court premises, but only in designated places.33
In the instant case, the investigating judges found that Judge Bajan openly smoked during trial and in chambers. It was further noted that even court staff have complained about his smoking habits, but to no avail.34
In addition, Judge Bajan violated OCA Circular No. 90-2004 when he heard and brought cases of other courts to his sala without any authority.
Under the Constitution, only the Supreme Court can order the change of venue or place of trial in order to avoid the miscarriage of justice.35 To implement this Constitutional provision, OCA Circular No. 90-200436 was issued, the relevant portions of which state:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that in accordance with Section 5(3), Article VIII of the Constitution, vesting this Court with the power to assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require, and with Section 6 of the same article mandating that this court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof, cases assigned to judges who have been transferred, detailed, or assigned to any branch within or outside the judicial region of the same court or promoted to a higher court shall be managed and decided under the following guidelines:
. . . .
2. Except as herein provided, all cases shall remain in the branch to which these have been raffled or assigned. Only cases that have been submitted for decision or those past the trial stage, i.e., where all the parties have finished presenting their evidence, prior to the transfer or promotion of the judge to which these are raffled/assigned shall be resolved or disposed by him/her in accordance with the guidelines herein set forth.37 (Emphasis supplied)
During the tenure of Judge Bajan as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Placer-Bacuag, Surigao del Norte, he was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 2, MTCC of Surigao City, Surigao del Norte in 2012. He was also designated as Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC of Tubod-Alegria, Surigao del Norte in 2015.38 In his Investigation Report, RTC EJ Bordalba confirmed that Judge Bajan heard cases pending in the other courts at Branch 2, MCTC of Surigao City, Surigao del Norte.39
Venue is essentially for the greatest convenience possible of the plaintiffs and their witnesses.40 By hearing cases from another branch, Judge Bajan affected the orderly dispensation of justice. Indeed, Judge Bajan overstepped his authority. Aside from the inconvenience caused to litigants, it is undeniable that Judge Bajan also jeopardized the safekeeping of court records and evidence. More significantly, by hearing and transferring cases from other courts to a different station, Judge Bajan arrogated upon himself authority no less than only the High Court possesses. Needless to state, such conduct cannot be tolerated.
Habitual tardiness
Similarly, habitual absenteeism or tardiness is classified as a less serious charge under section 15(c) of Revised Rule 140.
In Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the 1st Semester of 2005,41 the Court explained the rationale for penalizing habitual tardiness:
As enshrined in the Constitution, a public office is a public trust. Inherent in this mandate is the observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof for public service, if only to recompense the Government, and ultimately, the people, who shoulder the cost of maintaining the Judiciary. Thus, to inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees must at all times strictly observe official time.42
For this reason, the Supreme Court enjoins all judges and court personnel to strictly observe prescribed session hours. OCA Circular No. 63-2001,43 the prevailing guideline at the time of the incidents mentioned in the Complaint, required session hours to be conducted from Monday to Friday, from 8:30 a.m. to 12 noon and from 2:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Furthermore, OCA Circular No. 250-1544 which is a reiteration of the same guideline additionally states:
B. Strict Observance of Session Hours
. . . .
2. The hours in the morning and afternoon shall be devoted to the conduct of trial, unless already done, in which case the afternoon hours shall be utilized for (1) the conduct of pre-trial conferences; (2) writing of decisions, resolutions, or orders; or (3) the continuation of trial on the merits, whenever rendered necessary, as may be required by the Rules of Court, statutes, or circulars in specified cases.
3. Except those requiring immediate action, all motions should be scheduled for hearing on Friday, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the next business day. The unauthorized practice of some judges of entertaining motions or setting them for hearing on any other day or time must be avoided.
An employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he or she incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, 10 times a month for at least two months in a semester or for at least two consecutive months during the year.45 In this instance, the investigating judges reported that Judge Bajan began his court sessions between 11:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. to the detriment of the public who arrive as early as 8:30 a.m.46 In response to this accusation, Judge Bajan merely stated that "[t]he work of a judge is mental in nature and as such in making resolution or decision of cases in his sala, he brings it into his sleep and dreams; in other words, it [is a] 24/7 work."47 It goes without saying that such an excuse is unacceptable.
Time and again, the Court has reminded members of the bench that circulars prescribing hours of work are not just empty pronouncements.48 These are intended to promote efficiency and speed in the administration of justice, and thus, require prompt and faithful compliance by all concerned.49 By requiring judges to be punctual, these circulars show that the Court values the time of litigants, witnesses, and lawyers alike. If Judge Bajan himself is not punctual, he not only sets a bad example to the Bar but indubitably, tends to create dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.
In light of the determination that Judge Bajan failed to adhere to the prescribed session hours, it is reasonable to infer that such noncompliance would lead to delays in the resolution of cases and matters presented before him across all his stations. Nonetheless, there is no factual basis in the records to support the claim that Judge Bajan delayed acting on pending matters before him. Neither investigating judge was able to confirm this charge in their respective investigations. In fact, MTCC EJ Bordalba related that he had not found any apparent or serious delays in the disposition of his pending cases.50 Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to hold Judge Bajan guilty of simple neglect of duty for delay in resolving cases and incidents as recommended by the JIB.51
Simple misconduct constituting a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
Judge Bajan is liable for simple misconduct constituting a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which is penalized under section 15(a) of Revised Rule 140 for his sleeping during a court hearing.
Misconduct is defined as the "intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior; and to constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer."52 To differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.53
The Court has ruled that any scandalous behavior or act that may erode the people's esteem for the Judiciary is tantamount to simple misconduct.54 Clearly, Judge Bajan's act of falling asleep during trial, leaving lawyers no other option except to step out of the courtroom, is unbecoming for a magistrate who is tasked to administer the law. Judges, as judicial frontliners, must always behave with propriety as they are the embodiments of people's sense of justice. High standards of decorum are essential to promote public confidence in the Judiciary's integrity and impartiality.55 The relevant provision of the New Code of Judicial Conduct reads:
CANON 4
Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.56
Hence, for putting the image of the Judiciary into disrepute, Judge Bajan is guilty of simple misconduct for violation of Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Gross insubordination
Compliance with the directive to comment on complaints against court personnel and members of the Judiciary is not a mere formality. Jurisprudence dictates that all directives of the Court Administrator and his or her deputies are issued in the exercise of the Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and their personnel and hence, should be respected.57 These directives are not mere requests, but should be complied with promptly and completely. The same principle applies with directives originating from the JIB, as it has been delegated the power to process administrative complaints against judges and other members of the Judiciary.58
Depending on the circumstances, a respondent's failure to comment on administrative complaints has been alternatively regarded by the Court as a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and orders;59 insubordination;60 or even gross misconduct.61
In this instance, the Court finds that Judge Bajan's nonfeasance is tantamount to gross insubordination, a serious charge, under section 14(11) of Revised Rule 140 for his failure to comply with repeated directives by the OCA and the JIB to file comment.
Unlike the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service which sanctions both insubordination and gross insubordination as less grave and grave offenses, respectively, only gross insubordination was retained under Revised Rule 140 as an offense. In any case, jurisprudence defines insubordination and gross insubordination as the "inexplicable and unjustified refusal to obey some order that a superior is entitled to give and have obeyed, and imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of [a] superior."62
In a letter63 dated May 2, 2014, former Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez, required Judge Bajan to submit a more comprehensive comment after the veracity of the allegations contained in the first anonymous complaint lodged against him was confirmed. This was because Judge Bajan failed to directly address the substance of the accusations against him, instead, dismissing them as mere harassment.64 Despite two subsequent notices, Judge Bajan still did not comply with this directive from the OCA.65 Similarly, Judge Bajan was directed by the JIB to file a verified comment on the instant Complaint on two separate occasions, which he likewise ignored.66
Indeed, it should be borne in mind that the Court shall not and will not tolerate the indifference of a respondent to an administrative complaint and to resolutions requiring action on these complaints. Respondents ought to take such directives seriously by commenting on all accusations or allegations against them as it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the Judiciary.67 The Court can hardly discharge its constitutional mandate of overseeing judges and court personnel, and of taking proper administrative sanction against them if the judge or personnel concerned does not even recognize its administrative authority.68
Under the attendant circumstances, the Court finds that Judge Bajan's manifest indifference to, and disregard of, the directives issued to him by the OCA and the JIB is tantamount to gross insubordination.
The Court, in Beltran v. Pabica,69 held respondent, a stenographer and acting clerk of court, guilty of gross insubordination for such similar conduct. Respondent was accused of solicitation and violating the prohibition against assisting a party-litigant in finding legal representation. Respondent failed to comply with the directives of the OCA and the Court itself, spanning almost 12 years, to file a comment despite notice; to show cause to explain her failure to comply with the Court's directives; and to pay the PHP 5,000.00 fine assessed against her for the same defiance of the Court's resolutions. Additionally, respondent was found guilty of gross misconduct for violating several provisions of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
In view of her compulsory retirement, respondent was meted the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations in accordance with section 18(a) of Revised Rule 140 for both serious charges.
Meanwhile, in Judge Santiago v. Fernando,70 in addition to gross misconduct, the Court found respondent guilty of two counts of gross insubordination: first, for his repeated failure to comply with orders issued by the complainant judge; and second, for seeking an extension to file comment and thereafter, going on absence without leave without filing the required comment. Records disclosed that initially, respondent submitted a comment to the complaint, but failed to comply with subsequent directives by the OCA to file a comment on the supplemental complaint charging him with equally serious infractions. For the first count of gross insubordination, the Court ordered the dismissal of the respondent from service, but as he was already dropped from the rolls of court employees, he was penalized with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. For the second charge of gross insubordination for noncompliance with OCA directives, he was fined PHP 150,000.00.
Similar to the Beltran case, over 10 years have passed since Judge Bajan was instructed to submit a more comprehensive comment on the charges against him, yet he has failed to do so. Further, as observed in Judge Santiago, compliance with the directive to comment on an administrative complaint should not be complied with partially or selectively; otherwise, the appropriate sanction will be imposed. Ultimately, Judge Bajan's actions unmistakably demonstrate his disregard and defiance, not only towards the OCA and the JIB, but also towards the Court itself, who holds direct administrative authority over all court personnel, thereby rendering him culpable for gross insubordination.71
Judge Bajan has no liability as a member of the Philippine Bar
It is worth noting that both the anonymous complaints and the Complaint filed by the OGC do not mention any administrative liability being pursued against Judge Bajan in his capacity as a lawyer. Still, the Court notes that the JIB recommended imposing an additional penalty on Judge Bajan as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Considering the facts of the case, however, We conclude that no additional disciplinary sanction is warranted.
In the present case, the JIB charged Judge Bajan for violating several provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which was then the governing code of conduct and ethical standards for lawyers. As previously discussed, Judge Bajan failed to comply with the show cause order which accompanied the directive to file comment. Such failure was, therefore, construed as his waiver to participate in the proceedings.72
In the show cause Order,73 the JIB cited the following provisions allegedly violated by Judge Bajan: Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02;74 and Canon 11, Rules 11.02 and 11.0375 of the CPR. During the interim, however, the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA) was passed which repealed the CPR. Accordingly, the JIB evaluated his actions anew. under the CPRA and in its Report, explained the rationale for its recommendation to hold Judge Bajan guilty for simple misconduct and be fined in the amount of PHP 50,000.00, thus:
Regarding respondent Judge's liability as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court mandates that every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. The acts of respondent of smoking during office hours, starting hearing beyond the time frame set by the Supreme Court, and even sleeping during trial contravene Section 1 and 2, Canon II (Propriety) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA) which provide:
Canon II PROPRIETY
A lawyer shall, at all times, act with propriety and maintain the appearance of propriety in personal and professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and courtesy, and uphold the dignity of the legal profession consistent with the highest standards of ethical behavior.
SECTION 1. Proper conduct. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
SECTION 2. Dignified conduct. — A lawyer shall respect the law, the courts, tribunals, and other government agencies, their officials, employees, and processes, and act with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor towards fellow members of the bar.
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one's fitness to practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner, whether in public or private life, to the discredit of the legal profession.76
Essentially, section 4 of Revised Rule 140 provides that the same acts which leads to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against members of the Judiciary may likewise be the basis of imposing upon them disciplinary sanctions as members of the legal profession. It is Our view, however, that section 4 does not contemplate automatically holding judges liable for all improper acts that have a corresponding provision under the CPRA or the Revised Lawyer's Oath. As a code of ethics, the provisions of the CPRA and the Revised Lawyer's Oath are broad and all-compassing. Consequently, nearly all actions of a judge could inevitably serve as grounds for disciplinary action as lawyers.
Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, in his Concurring Opinion in the case of Castillo v. Asuncion,77 makes this important clarification:
Indeed, Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, allows for a disciplinary action against a respondent as a member of the Bar:
SECTION 4. Administrative Case Considered as Disciplinary Actions Against Members of the Philippine Bar. — An administrative case against any of those mentioned in Section 1(1) of this Rule shall also be considered as a disciplinary action against him or her, provided that the complaint specifically states that the imputed acts or omissions therein likewise constitute a violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics, or such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
If the complaint fails to include such specific statement, or if the disciplinary proceedings are instituted motu proprio, the respondent, in the interest of due process, must first be required to show cause in this respect before he or she is likewise disciplined as a member of the Philippine Bar as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case.
I draw attention, however, to the abovementioned proviso in the first paragraph and to the phrase in the second paragraph "as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case." To my mind, these cautionary provisions mean that not every offense under Rule 140 ipso facto merits a similar disciplinary action against a respondent as a member of the Bar.
Parenthetically, before the amendment of Rule 140 and the inclusion of Section 4 therein, what was in effect was A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution was entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, Judges of Regular and Special Courts, and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar." It relevantly provides in part that "[s]ome administrative cases against [J]ustices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan Judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility[,] and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers." This only goes to show that, historically—and by the very language of the Court—the recognition has always been that not all administrative cases against a judge call for a concomitant disciplinary action against him or her as a member of the Bar.78 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, before judges facing allegations under Revised Rule 140 may also be subjected to disciplinary action as lawyers, an inquiry must be made to determine whether their alleged misconduct, if later proven, would call into question their integrity as members of the legal profession.79 Thus, beyond impacting the Judiciary's image as a whole, an assessment must be made whether the judge's transgressions also cast serious doubt on his or her moral fitness.80 After all, possession of good moral character is not simply a requirement for the admission to the Bar, but also a continuing requirement for its members.81 Hence, the imposition of additional disciplinary measures should be confined to cases involving the commission of patently unlawful acts, immorality, abuse of power, deceitful, or dishonest conduct,82 among others, that clearly reflect on their personal character or moral fitness to continue practicing law. It should seriously affect the standing of the judge or court personnel as an officer of the court.
Applied to the facts of the present case, while smoking within court premises, failing to observe the proper session hours, conducting hearings outside the designated courts and even sleeping during trial are improper, they clearly pertain to the performance of Judge Bajan's official functions. More importantly, these actions do not rise to a level of moral delinquency that would justify Us reconsidering his continued membership in the legal profession or imposing additional sanctions. Thus, while his conduct undeniably fell short of the high standards expected of a magistrate, the same does not necessarily apply to his standing as a member of the legal profession.
The proper penalties
In totality, Judge Bajan is found guilty of the five offenses: (1) two counts of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars that establish an internal policy, rule or procedure, or protocol; (2) habitual tardiness; (3) simple misconduct constituting a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct; and (4) gross insubordination. Accordingly, five distinct penalties shall be imposed on Judge Bajan in accordance with prevailing rules.83
Relevantly, there is no modifying circumstance which can serve to mitigate Judge Bajan's liability. His more than 10 years84 of government service cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, since this presupposes that he has had no previous disciplinary record resulting in an administrative penalty.85 The Court notes, however, that Judge Bajan has been previously held administratively liable in the following cases:
1. In A.M. No. MTJ-20-194186 – Judge Bajan was fined PHP 21,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, PHP 12,000.00 for undue delay in rendering a decision, and PHP 20,000.00 for habitual tardiness. He was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely;
2. In A.M. No. MTJ-16-186887 – Judge Bajan was fined PHP 30,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and procedure; and
3. In A.M. No. P-17-3707 (Re: Order of Judge Bajan suspending Process Server Mercy Canoy for 30 days)88 – Judge Bajan was fined PHP 1,000.00 for immediately suspending respondent, which was increased to PHP 2,000.00 when Judge Bajan failed to file his comment despite receipt of the OCA directive to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.
Meanwhile, section 17 of Revised Rule 140 outlines the sanctions that may be imposed on a respondent based on the classification of the charge against a respondent. Considering that Judge Bajan has already retired from service, he can no longer serve the penalty of suspension. Thus, the Court deems it appropriate to order him to pay a fine for his infractions. For offenses classified as serious charges, the fine is more than PHP 100,000.00, but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00.89 For offenses classified as less serious charges, on the other hand, the fine ranges from PHP 35,000.00, but not exceeding PHP 100,000.00.90
Guided by these parameters, the Court adopts the recommendation of the JIB to impose a fine of PHP 50,000.00 each for smoking within court premises, for transferring cases without any authority, and for simple misconduct constituting a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which are less serious charges. Meanwhile, the Court deems it proper to impose a fine of PHP 100,000.00 for habitual tardiness in spite of only being a less serious charge, since this is the second time that Judge Bajan has been held administratively liable for the same offense;91 and has been warned that a repetition of the act will be dealt with more severely.92
With respect to the serious charge of gross insubordination, the Court deems it proper to impose a fine of PHP 300,000.00, which exceeds the maximum fine for a serious charge.93 This is to take in consideration the fact that this is Judge Bajan's second offense, and to further underscore the necessity of strict compliance with the Court's directives to file comment.
We are not unaware that dismissal from service is an available sanction for offenses classified as serious charges and in lieu thereof, the forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office.94 However, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, opts to extend Judge Bajan compassion, although not to the extent of a mitigating circumstance due to his previous administrative record. The Court notes that during his tenure as Presiding Judge of MTCC, Surigao del Norte, he was likewise designated as Executive Judge of the same MTCC95 and Acting Presiding Judge in two other stations, MCTC of Sison-Tagana-an and MCTC of Tubod-Alegria.96 Further, unlike the aforecited cases of Beltran and Judge Santiago, where the respondents were also found guilty of other serious charges along with gross insubordination, Judge Bajan faces gross insubordination as the only serious charge against him. The Court further observes that while his conduct as a magistrate was improper, there is no evidence that he neglected his judicial duties. Considering these circumstances, the Court finds that when a less severe penalty suffices, any missteps should not be met with excessively harsh consequences.97
Conclusion
Time and again, the Court stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with heavy responsibility. The Court, in the case of Fuensalida,98 explains:
It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.99
Indeed, judges are the visible representation of the law and more importantly, of justice. They should uplift the honor of the Judiciary, rather than bring it to disrepute. For this reason, the Court will not hesitate to discipline members of the Bench upon their failure to meet stringent judicial standards and undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Julieto N. Bajan, former Presiding Judge, Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte is GUILTY of the following offenses under A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC:
(1) Two counts of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars that establish an internal policy, rule or procedure, or protocol, as sanctioned under section 15(e) for: (i) smoking during trial and within court premises and (ii) violation of the prohibition of hearing cases from other courts. He is FINED in the amount of PHP 50,000.00 for each offense;
(2) Habitual tardiness, as sanctioned under section 15(c) in relation to section 20. He is FINED in the amount of PHP 100,000.00;
(3) Simple misconduct constituting a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, as sanctioned under section 15(a). He is FINED in the amount of PHP 50,000.00; and
(4) Gross insubordination, as sanctioned under section 14(n). He is FINED in the amount of PHP 300,000.00.
The fines in the aggregate amount of PHP 550,000.00 shall be paid within 30 days from the finality of this Decision.100 If unpaid within the period given, contempt proceedings shall be commenced against the respondent pursuant to Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court for disobeying a lawful order of this Court.101
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., see separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., see concurring opinion.
Marquez,* J., no part.
Singh,** J., on leave.
Footnotes
* No part due to prior action as Court Administrator.
** On leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 67-76, the Complaint dated April 20, 2022 was signed by Romulo A. Paras, Jr., General Counsel, JIB.
2 Id. at 4, 10.
3 Id. at 4.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 10.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 5.
9 Id. at 11.
10 Id. at 6, the Report dated January 28, 20 l3 was submitted by Executive Judge Victor A. Canoy of RTC Surigao City; id. at 15, the Report dated January 23, 2013 was submitted by Executive Judge Cesar P. Bordalba of MTCC Surigao City.
11 Id. at 21.
12 Id. at 23-24.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 26-27.
15 Id. at 29.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 70.
18 Titled "Strict Observance of Prescribed Working Hours and Session Hours and Rules on Punctuality and Attendance," October 3, 2001.
19 Strict Observance of Office Hours, January 21, 2015.
20 Smoking Prohibition Based on a 100% Smoke-Free Environment Policy, May 29, 2009.
21 Reiterating the Ban on Smoking as Provided for in Administrative Circular No. 09-99 and Reiterated and Clarified in Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A, January 22, 2008.
22 Id. at 71.
23 Rollo, p. 77.
24 Id. at 83, 99.
25 Id. at 86-95. The May 15, 2023 Report and Recommendation was penned by Deputy Clerk of Court at-Large Office of the Court Administrator and Acting Executive Director James D.V. Navarrete.
26 Id. at 94-95.
27 Id. at 96-109. The September 6, 2023 Report was penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (Ret.) and concurred in by Justices Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (Ret.), Sesinando E. Villon (Ret.), Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Ret.), and Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla of the Judicial Integrity Board.
28 Id. at 107-108.
29 A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, Further Amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, sec. 2(2), April 3, 2022.
30 Office of the Court Administrator v. Fuensalida, 880 Phil. 561 (2020) [Per J. Delos Santos, En Banc].
31 Id. at 569-570.
32 Judge Cobarrubias-Nabaza v. Atty. Lavandero, 920 Phil. 787, 791 (2022) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division.
33 Re: Smoking at the Fire Exit Area at the Back of the Public Information Office, 627 Phil. 516, 526 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
34 Rollo, p. 92.
35 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(4).
36 See OCA Circular No. 90-2004 (2004) titled "A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC Re: Guidelines in the Inventory and Adjudication of Cases Assigned to Judges who are Promoted or Transferred to Other Branches in the Same Court Level of the Judicial Hierarchy."
37 Id.
38 Rollo, pp. 57-60.
39 Id. at 12.
40 See Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals, 585 Phil. 38, 57 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
41 527 Phil. 1 (2006) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
42 Id. at 9.
43 See OCA Circular No. 63-2001 (2001) titled "Strict Observance of Prescribed Working Hours and Session Hours and Rules on Punctuality and Attendance" citing Administrative Circular No. 3-99 (1999) Entitled "Strict Observance of Session Hours of Trial Courts and Effective Management of Cases to Ensure Their Speedy Disposition."
44 See OCA Circular No. 250-15 (2015) titled "Reiteration of Strict Observance of Office and Session Hours, Posting of Court Calendar, Proper Office Attire, and Conduct of Flag Raising and Lowering Ceremonies."
45 Re: Habitual Tardiness First Semester 2002, 440 Phil. 349, 354 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
46 Rollo, p. 91.
47 Id. at 24.
48 Discreet Investigation Report Relative to the Anonymous Complaint against Judge Bacolod, 884 Phil. 43, 56 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
49 Id.
50 Rollo, p. 12.
51 Id. at 108.
52 Sarno-Davin v. Quirante, 868 Phil. 405,411 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
53 Id. at 411-412.
54 De Los Santos v. Vasquez, 826 Phil. 397, 402 (2018) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
55 See Tuvillo v. Judge Laron, 797 Phil. 449, 462-463 (2016) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
56 A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC (2004), Canon 4, sec. 1.
57 See Office of the Court Administrator v. Salao, 923 Phil. 618,623, 624 (2022) [Per J. Inting, Third Division].
58 See A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC (2020) titled "Establishment of the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) and the Corruption Prevention and Investigation Office (CPIO)."
59 Office of the Court Administrator v. Salao, 923 Phil. 618, 624 (2022) [Per J. Inting, Third Division]; In Re: Mendioro, JIB No. P-22-069 [Formerly A.M. No. 19-04-91-RTC], January 11, 2023 [Notice, Third Division]; Dulay v. Perez, A.M. No. P-22-062, December 13, 2023 [Notice, First Division]; Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta, 603 Phil. 94, 101 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division]; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Villegas, 474 Phil. 475,480 (2004) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
60 Office of the Court Administrator v. Berondo, A.M. No. P-22-046, February 23, 2022 [Notice, Second Division]; Judge Zarate-Fernandez v. Lovendino, 827 Phil. 191, 201 (2018) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Atty. Frades v. Gabriel, 821 Phil. 36, 48 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Judge Pamintuan v. Comuyog, Jr., 766 Phil. 566, 575 (2015) [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division]; Clemente v. Bautista, 710 Phil. 10, 16 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; Mendez v. Balbuena, 665 Phil. 161, 167 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Tan v. Sermania, 612 Phil. 314, 325 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
61 Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Galvez, 859 Phil. 188, 196 (2019) [Per J. Inting, Third Division]; Office of the Court Administrator v. Executive Judge Amor, 745 Phil. 1, 9 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]; Atty. Enriquez v. De Castro, 553 Phil. 244, 249 (2007) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Imbang v. Judge Del Rosario, 485 Phil. 466, 470 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
62 Judge Santiago v. Fernando, A.M. No. P-22-053 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-4466-P], January 17, 2023 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc] at 7. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Resolution uploaded to the Supreme Court website; Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin v. Dela Cruz, 604 Phil. 256, 261 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
63 Rollo, pp. 26-27.
64 Id. at 99.
65 Id. at 28-29, 1st Tracer dated July 24, 2015 and Letter dated February 1, 2021.
66 Id. at 77-83.
67 Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta, 603 Phil. 94, 103 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
68 Id. at 101.
69 A.M. No. P-14-3223, February 27, 2024 [Per Curiam, En Banc]. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
70 A.M. No. P-22-053 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-4466-P], January 17, 2023 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc]. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
71 See Mendez v. Balbuena, 665 Phil. 161, 167 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].
72 Rollo, p. 83.
73 Id. at 80-81.
74 CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1 states:
Canon 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
75 CODE or PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 11 states:
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.01. — A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 — A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
76 Rollo, p. 104.
77 A.M. No. RTJ-23-039 [Formerly JIB FPI No. 21-075-RTJ], August 20, 2024 [Per J. Inting, En Banc].
78 J. Caguioa, Concurring Opinion in Castillo v. Asuncion, A.M. No. RTJ-23-039 [Formerly JIB FPI No. 21-075-RTJ], August 20, 2024 [Per J. Inting, En Banc] at 2. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Concurring Opinion uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
79 CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY& ACCOUNTABILITY, Preamble.
80 Magayanes v. Vasquez-Abad, A.M. No. MTJ-23-014 [Formerly JIB FPI No. 21-0240-MTJ], April 11, 2024 [Per Curiam, En Banc] at 35. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Indar, 685 Phil. 272, 293 (2012) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Samson v. Judge Caballero, 612 Phil. 737, 748-749 (2009) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
81 Magayanes v. Vasquez-Abad, id.
82 See id.
83 Revised Rule 140, sec. 21.
84 Rollo, p. 106.
85 Revised Rule 140, sec. 19 states:
Section 19. Modifying Circumstances. — In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed, the Court may, in its discretion, appreciate the following mitigating and aggravating circumstances:
(1) Mitigating Circumstances:
. . . .
(b) Length of service of at least ten (10) years with no previous disciplinary record where respondent was meted with an administrative penalty
86 Rollo, pp. 31-41, Chua v. Bajan, A.M. No. MTJ-20-1941, August 27, 2020 [Notice, First Division].
87 Id. at 34; Abogadye v. Bajan, A.M. No. MTJ 16-1868, March 2, 2016 [Notice, Second Division].
88 Id.; see Chua v. Bajan, A.M. No. MTJ-20-1941, August 27, 2020 [Notice, First Division].
89 Revised Rule 140, sec. 17 (l) states:
(1) If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
(a) Dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Supreme Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
(b) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than [six] months but not exceeding [one] year; or
(c) A fine of more than [PHP] 100,000.00 but not exceeding [PHP] 200,000.00.
90 Revised Rule 140, sec. 17 (2) states:
(2) If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
(a) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than [one] month nor more than [six] months; or
(b) A fine of more than [PHP] 35,000.00 but not exceeding [PHP] 100,000.00.
91 See Revised Rule 140, sec. 20, which states:
Section 20. Manner of Imposition. — If one (1) or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances are present, the Supreme Court may impose the penalties of suspension or fine for a period or amount not exceeding double of the maximum prescribed under this Rule.
If one (1) or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the Supreme Court may impose the penalties of suspension or fine for a period or amount not less than half of the minimum prescribed under this Rule.
If there are both aggravating and mitigating circumstances present, the Supreme Court may offset each other. (Emphasis supplied)
92 See Chua v. Bajan, A.M. No. MTJ-20-1941, August 27, 2020 [Notice, First Division].
93 Revised Rule 140, sec. 20.
94 Revised Rule 140, sec. 18.
SECTION 18. Penalty in Lieu of Dismissal on Account of Supervening Resignation, Retirement, or Other Modes of Separation of Service. — If the respondent is found liable for an offense which merits the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service but the same can no longer be imposed due to the respondent's supervening resignation, retirement, or other modes of separation from service except for death, he or she may be meted with the following penalties in lieu of dismissal:
a) Forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Supreme Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; and/or
(b) Fine as stated in Section [17(l)(c)] of this Rule.
95 Rollo, pp. 61.
96 Id. at 57-60.
97 See Judge Pamintuan v. Comuyog, Jr., 766 Phil. 566, 580 (2015) [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division].
98 Office of the Court Administrator v. Fuensalida, 880 Phil. 561 (2020) [Per J. Delos Santos, En Banc].
99 Id. at 567.
100 Revised Rule 140, section 22; Ignacio v. Balading, A.M. No. P-24-150 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4030 P], July 30, 2024 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc] at 7-8. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
101 Id.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
