SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 260547, November 26, 2024 ]
XXX260547, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DISSENT
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The ponencia reversed the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and accordingly acquitted petitioner XXX260547 for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 in view of the alleged insufficiency of the Information against petitioner. The Information reads:
That starting August 2014 and up to present in Brgy. ███████, ███████ and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the lawful husband of private complainant [AAA260547], did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit act or series of acts likely to cause said complainant to suffer psychological abuse by leaving said complainant in order to live with another woman [YYY260547] and by totally neglecting to provide his two (2) children with the complainant the necessary support to the damage and prejudice of said [AAA260547].
Contrary to Section 5(i) in relation to Section 6 of [Republic Act No.] 9262 otherwise known as The Anti-Violence against Women and Children Act of 2004.1
The Decision held that the Information indicting petitioner failed to allege that his wife AAA260547 and their children suffered mental or emotional anguish due to the acts attributed to petitioner. Instead, it merely stated that petitioner leaving AAA260547 to cohabitate with his paramour and his failure to provide support to their two children were "likely to cause complainant [AAA260547] to suffer psychological abuse" and that such acts were to AAA260547's "damage and prejudice[.]" According to the ponencia, however, psychological abuse or violence does not equate to and is an entirely separate element from mental and emotional anguish.
At the outset, allow me to discuss what constitutes a sufficient Information vis-à-vis the rights of an accused.
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused requires a sufficient complaint or information. It is deeply rooted in one's constitutional rights to due process and the presumption of innocence.2
Due process dictates that an accused be fully informed of the reason and basis for his or her indictment. This would allow an accused to properly form a theory and to prepare his or her defense, because he or she is "presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense [he or she] has purportedly committed."3
Aside from the usual requirements of an Information under Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court,4 the allegations in the Information are vital because they determine "the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused[.]"5 They are given more weight than a prosecutor's designation of the offense in the caption. Quimvel v. People6 is apropos:
Indeed, the Court has consistently put more premium on the facts embodied in the Information as constituting the offense rather than on the designation of the offense in the caption.(awÞhi( In fact, an investigating prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, being conclusions of law. It then behooves this Court to place the text of the Information under scrutiny.
On the other hand, Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court state how the offense is designated and the cause of accusation indicated in the information, viz.:
Section 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Based on the foregoing, an Information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.7 It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the Information.8 Further, as stated earlier, the allegations in the Information prevails over the designation of the offense.
Therefore, the test of sufficiency of an information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.9
Here, petitioner argues that the Information filed against him is defective since it failed to charge any offense. Petitioner points out that not all the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 were indicated in the Information, as there was no mention that AAA260547 or any of his children suffered mental or emotional anguish because of the acts imputed against him. He also asserts that the allegation in the Information that he caused AAA260547 to suffer psychological abuse is a conclusion of law and there were no allegations of fact constituting psychological abuse in the Information. Finally, he claims that he cannot be held liable for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, as the provision punishes repeated incidents of marital infidelity and the prosecution failed to prove that he repeatedly cheated on his wife.
I beg to disagree.
The Information is sufficient regardless of the fact that psychological abuse or violence, and not mental or emotional anguish was mentioned in the Information.
In XXX v. People,10 the Court held that psychological violence is the indispensable element under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. It is defined in Section 3(c) of the same law as acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
On the other hand, Dinamling v. People11 differentiated mental or emotional anguish and psychological violence in that the former is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party by reason of the latter. Stated differently, psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party by reason of psychological violence.
It goes without saying, therefore that it is immaterial in this case that mental anguish was not specifically alleged in the Information since psychological violence is the vital element of the offense. Further, as held in Dinamling, emotional anguish is subsumed in psychological violence since the offended party necessarily suffers emotional anguish by reason of psychological violence.
To emphasize, contrary to the ruling of the ponencia, the Information properly charged petitioner for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Petitioner's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him was not violated since the Information, being sufficient in form and substance, enabled him to properly prepare for his defense.
Another, petitioner claims that there were no allegations of fact constituting psychological abuse in the Information. Petitioner is mistaken. Here, that petitioner left AAA260547 to live with his paramour YYY260547 constituting marital infidelity; and totally neglecting to provide support for their children, are specific allegations of acts of psychological violence which are causing or likely to cause emotional anguish to AAA260547 and her children.
XXX v. People12 further elucidates that in instances where marital infidelity is the act concerned, the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is satisfied the moment the perpetrator decides to commit the act of marital infidelity, thus:
Moreover, while We agree with Acharon that the crimes penalized under Sec. 5(i) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, thereby requiring specific criminal intent, it is the Court's position that in instances where marital infidelity is the act concerned as in the present case, the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is satisfied the moment the perpetrator decides to commit the act of marital infidelity. This finds basis on the fact that marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved, is in all instances wrong, and cannot be justified by any sort of context, while the same cannot be said for willful denial of financial support. In other words, marital infidelity, divorced from its legal connotations, is an act which is wrong in itself. To pose a rhetoric, what else could adulterers have expected to cause upon their spouse when they committed an act of unfaithfulness, aside from mental and emotional pain?
Notably, specific intent to cause mental and emotional anguish upon the victim may be conclusively presumed from the fact of infidelity itself.
Finally, petitioner is incorrect in arguing that he cannot be held liable for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 because his marital infidelity is not repetitive. His claim has no basis both in law and jurisprudence. Nothing under Republic Act No. 9262 states that the marital infidelity should be repetitive. Again, the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is satisfied the moment the perpetrator decides to commit the act of marital infidelity which caused emotional anguish to the offended party.
All told, I vote to sustain the validity of the Information against petitioner and accordingly rule on the merits of the petition.
Footnotes
1 Ponencia, p. 2.
2 Ismael and Ajijon v. People, G.R. Nos. 234435-36, February 6, 2023 [Per J. Lopez, M., Second Division].
3 Villarba v. People, 874 Phil. 84, 102 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
4 (1) the accused's name; (2) the statute's designation of the offense; (3) the acts or omissions complained of that constitute the offense; (4) the offended party's name; (5) the approximate date of the offense's commission; and (6) the place where the offense was committed.
5 Villarba v. People, 874 Phil. 84, 104 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
6 808 Phil. 889, 913 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
7 People v. ZZZ, 901 Phil. 251, 256 (2021) [Per J. Hernando, Third Division].
8 People v. Lim, 914 Phil. 374, 381 (2021) [Per J. Inting, Second Division].
9 People v. Solar, 858 Phil. 884, 919-920 (2019) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
10 893 Phil. 840, 846 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
11 761 Phil. 356, 376 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
12 G.R. No. 252739, April 16, 2024 [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].
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