G.R. No. 257401

G.R. No. 257401, March 28, 2023,
♦ Decision, Inting, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]

LINCONN UY ONG, PETITIONER, VS. THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS (BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE); HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE; HON. SENATOR VICENTE C. SOTTO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES; MGEN RENE C. SAMONTE AFP (RET.), IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, RESPONDENTS.

MICHAEL YANG HONG MING, PETITIONER, VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, RESPONDENT.

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which ultimately plead for a clearer definition and delineation of the scope and extent of the Senate's power of inquiry in aid of legislation.

Linconn Uy Ong (Ong), a member of the Board of Directors and the Supply Chain Manager of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Pharmally) filed the first Petition1 for Certiorari and Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayers for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

In the main, Ong assails the Order2 dated September 10, 2021 (Contempt Order), which respondent Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, or Committee) issued against him.3 In particular, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest for testifying falsely and evasively during the September 10, 2021 hearing conducted relative to the Commission on Audit (COA) Consolidated Annual Audit Report for Fiscal Year 2020 4 (COA Report) relating to the expenditures of the Department of Health (DOH) on the "fight against COVID."

Ong also challenges the constitutionality of: (1) Section 18 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, as amended5 (Senate Rules on Inquiries); and (2) Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee6 (collectively, assailed rules) insofar as they punish for contempt his alleged act of "testifying falsely or evasively" is concerned.

Meanwhile, Michael Yang Hong Ming (Yang), a Chinese citizen with permanent residency in the Philippines, a former Presidential Economic Adviser, and member of the Philippine Full Win Group of Companies, Inc., filed the second Petition7 for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the nullification of the Arrest Orders8 dated September 7 and 10, 2021. He also seeks for the nullification of the Lookout Bulletin issued by the Bureau of Immigration in accordance with the Committee's Letter-Request9 dated September 13, 2021. Further, he prays that the Committee be ordered to desist from compelling him to disclose information involving his properties and business interests, as embodied in the Committee's Letter-Request10 dated November 9, 2021.11

Following the COA Report, the Committee resolved to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation pertaining in particular to DOH's expenditures in relation to the "fight against COVID." Consequently, it sent invitations via electronic mail to resource persons, referring to them matters subject of the inquiry and requesting them to attend the hearings.12

On August 18, 2021, the Committee conducted its first hearing.13 In the course thereof, it found out that Pharmally, the incorporators of which were identified to have personal links with Yang, was able to secure a total of P8.868 Billion worth of contracts from the Procurement Service of the Department of Budget and Management (PS-DBM).14

On August 23, 2021, Senator Risa Hontiveros (Sen. Hontiveros) delivered a privilege speech15 that was later referred to the Committee. That same day until August 25, 2021, the following were filed: (1) Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 858,16 by Senate Majority Leader, Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Sen. Zubiri); (2) PSR No. 859,17 by Sen. Leila M. De Lima (Sen. De Lima); and (3) PSR No. 880,18 by Sen. Hontiveros. These PSRs were all referred to the Committee.19 The privilege speech and the subject PSRs all pertained to expenditures relative to the government's response to COVID-19 and other health concerns.

On August 26, 2021, the Committee issued Subpoena Ad Testificandum directing the following: Huang Tzu Yen (Huang), Mohit Dargani (Mohit), and Twinkle Dargani (Twinkle), all of Pharmally; and Yang to attend the hearing on August 27, 2021 and testify on the matter under inquiry.20 However, Huang, Mohit, Twinkle, and Yang failed to attend the hearing set on August 27, 2021.21

On August 31, 2021, the Committee sent a Subpoena Ad Testificandum directing Yang to attend the September 7, 2021 hearing.22 Similar subpoenas were sent on September 4, 2021 to Ong and Krizle Grace Mago (Mago).23

On September 7, 2021, Ong, Mago, Yang, and other Pharmally officials failed and/or refused to appear at the hearing. Accordingly, the Committee issued Orders24 citing Ong, Mago, Mohit, Twinkle, and Yang in contempt for failure to appear in the scheduled hearings. It ordered their arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms (OSAA) until such time that they appear and give their testimony, or otherwise purge themselves of the contempt.25

According to Ong, he learned from the media reports on September 7, 2021 that he was among those cited in contempt and ordered arrested and detained for "refusing to appear, despite notice" at the Committee hearings of August 27, 2021 and September 7, 2021. He alleged that he did not receive any subpoena or invitation from the Committee. Still, he voluntarily attended the online videoconferencing hearing on September 10, 2021.26

In the course of his examination during the hearing, the Committee again cited Ong in contempt and ordered his arrest and detention for "testifying falsely and evasively." The assailed Contempt Order27 dated September 10, 2021 was issued by the Committee,28 signed by Sen. Richard J. Gordon (Sen. Gordon) as Chairperson and approved by Senate President Vicente C. Sotto III (Sen. Pres. Sotto III).

However, Ong was not immediately taken to the Senate premises because he was then suffering from COVID-19. The Senators allowed him to stay at his residence but ordered the Sergeant-at-Arms to post a guard outside his abode.29

Several hearings of the Committee were further conducted on September 13, 17, and 21, 2021, with the attendance and participation of Ong.30

On September 21, 2021, the OSAA arrested Ong, who was attending the online Committee hearings remotely at his residence, and detained him under its custody at the Senate Complex, Pasay City on authority of the assailed Contempt Order.31

On September 22, 2021, Ong filed a Respectful Manifestation and Motion for House Arrest. However, the Committee did not act on the manifestation and motion.32

On September 24, 2021, the Committee continued with its hearings with Ong in attendance through videoconference. In the course of Ong's examination, Sen. Franklin M. Drilon (Sen. Drilon) moved, seconded by Sen. Francis Pangilinan (Sen. Pangilinan), to transfer Ong to the Pasay City Jail.33

On October 5, 2021, Ong, through counsel, filed the present petition. Thereafter, respondents filed their comment.34

On November 12, 2021, Ong filed his Motion to Resolve Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order or Temporary Restraining Order.35

On November 29, 2021, the Committee transferred Ong, together with Mohit, to the Pasay City Jail.36

According to Yang, the Committee sent a subpoena on August 27, 2021 to his office, PAILI Holdings Corporation (PAILI). While it required his attendance at the hearing scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day, the receptionist of PAILI received the subpoena only at 8:00 a.m. of the same day. Allegedly, Yang's secretary was unable to contact Yang, who was in Subic where the telephone signal was poor, until the next day. The secretary sent an email to the Committee informing it that Yang could not be contacted on such short notice.37

Yang also alleged that he was: (1) not informed of and duly served with the subpoena served at PAILI on September 2, 2021; (2) not notified that he had to appear before the Committee on September 7, 2021; and (3) also not informed of the subpoena served at his residence at 19 Narra St., Forbes Park, Makati City on September 3, 2021 because he was in Davao and there was no one in his Makati City residence duly authorized to receive court processes in his behalf.38

Purportedly, Yang learned of the Committee's order for him to attend the hearing on September 7, 2021 only through friends and online news.1aшphi1 He insisted that it was only on September 6, 2021 that he was able to hire a lawyer, who emailed the Director General of the Committee stating that "(a)lthough [Yang] has not received a copy of the subpoena, he has expressed his full and complete cooperation to provide information that [the] Committee may need from him in aid of legislation."39 A hard copy of the letter of appearance was immediately sent to the Chairperson of the Committee.40

Nonetheless, the Committee issued a warrant for Yang's arrest in the afternoon of September 7, 2021.41

On September 10, 2021, Yang appeared before the Committee for the first time. In the course of the hearing, it issued an Order placing Yang under arrest for allegedly giving evasive answers which amounted to a contempt of the Committee.42

Thereafter, Yang attended the hearings on September 17, 21, and 24, 2021.43 Subsequently, a Look-Out Bulletin was issued against Yang.44

On November 9, 2021 the Committee, through its Director-General, issued the letter-request asking Yang to supply documents and information pertaining to his property and business interests.45

The Senate filed its Comment47 contending that the validity or constitutionality of the Senate Rules on Inquiries may not be looked into by the court because it constitutes a political question. It likewise asse1ts that Section 18 of the rules is neither vague nor impermissibly broad, and has complied with the requirements of Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, it finds no sufficient ground to justify the grant of status quo ante order, TRO or preliminary injunction.48

Meanwhile, Yang insists that the Committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:

The Senate filed its Comment asserting that: (1) the Committee legally cited Yang in contempt, ordered his arrest and detention, and validly caused the issuance of a lookout order against him; (2) the Committee respected Yang's constitutional rights as required under the Senate rules; (3) the questions propounded to Yang and the documents and information required from him during the proceedings are within the scope of legislative inquiry and in consonance with his right to privacy; and (4) there was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to Yang which he should have exhausted before filing the instant suit with the court.50

Invoking the mandate of its office, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deems it necessary to intervene in the case as the present petitions raise the issue of constitutionality of the Senate Rules, as well as a transgression of the Bill of Rights.51 The participation of the OSG is anchored on Section 35(3), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, entitling it to be heard in any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any government regulation.52

On June 7, 2022, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the petitions be dismissed on the ground of mootness, by reason of the voluntary release of Ong pursuant to the Order of Release issued by Sen. Pres. Sotto III, and the termination of the subject legislative inquiry.

Finding no procedural infirmities in the petitions, the Court narrows down the inquiry to the following substantive issues:

Preliminarily, it bears noting that on June 30, 2022, the 18th Congress of the Philippines conducted its final session which in effect terminated all proceedings of the House of Representatives and the Senate, including the Senate Committee's inquiry pertinent to the case. In their Manifestation and Motion, respondents aver that the petitions had been rendered moot by the voluntary release of Ong pursuant to the Order of Release issued by Sen. Pres. Sotto III and the termination of the subject legislative inquiry.

"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition."66 "Without any legal relief that may be granted, courts generally decline to resolve moot cases, lest the ruling result in a mere advisory opinion."67 In Balag v. Senate of the Philippines,68 the Court explained:

The existence of an actual case or controversy is a necessary condition precedent to the court's exercise of its power of adjudication. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe for judicial resolution. In the negative, a justiciable controversy must neither be conjectural nor moot and academic. There must be a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of the parties who have adverse legal interests. The reason is that the issue ceases to be justiciable when a controversy becomes moot and academic; otherwise, the court would engage in rendering an advisory opinion on what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.69

However, the moot and academic principle does not automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case,70 under the following instances: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.71 The Court finds that the issues raised in the petitions fall under the exceptions.

In resolving the issues raised, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the nature and incidents of the Senate's power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and its contempt power.

Time and again, the Court has affirmed the power of the Legislature to conduct investigation. The Legislature's power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.72

In Arnault v. Nazareno73 (Arnault), which was decided when the 1935 Constitution was in effect, the Court recognized an implied legislative power to conduct investigations with the necessary process to enforce it; this is to the end that it may legislate wisely or effectively by being able to compel the availability of information which will serve as basis for legislation. The Court discussed:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which is not infrequently true— recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.74 (Italics supplied; citations omitted.)

While the power of legislative investigation was only implicit under the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution are explicit as to the existence of such power.75

Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of the Legislature and its committees to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation has been upheld in The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Hon. Majaducom,76 Senate of the Philippines v. Exec. Sec. Ermita77 (Ermita), In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon78 (Sabio), Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks79 (Standard Chartered Bank), Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations80 (Neri), and Romero II v. Senator Estrada.81 This means that the mechanisms available to both the Senate and the House of Representatives, in order that they may effectively perform their legislative functions, are also available to their respective committees.82

Concomitant to the power of the Legislature to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is its power of contempt impliedly provided under the 1987 Constitution. Unlike the Legislature's power to make investigations in aid of legislation, there is no provision in the 1987 Constitution expressly granting either the Senate or the House of Representatives with the authority or process to enforce this power of inquiry. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the Legislature's power of contempt is inherent and arises by implication.83 This coercive process is essential to the Legislature's discharge of its functions. This power permits either House of the Legislature to perform its duties without impediment84 as it enables the Senate or the House of Representatives to legislate wisely or effectively because they have the power to compel the availability of information necessary in shaping legislation.85

Indeed, the exercise of the contempt power by the Legislature is anchored on the principle of self-preservation.86 As that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it independently of the Judicial Branch.87 Such power of the Legislature is sui generis as it "attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the Legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government."88

Strictly speaking, the power to arrest a witness is not specified under the Senate Rules of Procedure. Such Rules only cite the explicit power of the Senate to detain a witness. The Court, however, views that an arrest is necessary to carry out the coercive process of compelling attendance, testimony, and production of documents relevant and material in a legislative inquiry.

As observed in Arnault,"[e]xperience has shown that mere requests for [relevant] information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed."89 Indeed, the power of the Legislature to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is intended to be full and complete,90 according it the processes necessary to carry out its core function of legislation. The Senate, or the Congress as a whole, may effectively and wisely legislate for as long as it may compel the availability of information which in turn will be basis of a proposed law emanating from the proceedings in aid of legislation. The Congress is not precluded from causing the appearance of a resource person who is not before it. As long as the testimony of a resource person is primordial in the Legislature's inquiry in aid of legislation, then any House of Congress or its committees may compel, by way of an arrest, his or her appearance in the inquiry proceedings. Necessarily, compelled testimony connotes truthful declaration by a resource person subject of the legislative inquiry.

In Arnault, the Court stressed the power of the Senate to conduct investigations along with necessary processes to enforce it. Being inherent and necessary for it to effectively perform its function of inquiry in aid of legislation,91 this power to compel attendance, testimony, and production of documents relevant and necessary in a legislative inquiry need not find textual basis in the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. As the grant of legislative power which includes the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is intended to be complete, i.e., without need to resort to judicial process in order that the Legislature may be able to perform its function, it follows that the Legislature likewise has the power to resort to mechanisms to obey its processes. Indeed, depriving the Senate of this inherent and necessary power to compel a witness to appear, give a truthful testimony and produce documents before it will amount to a serious handicap to its Constitutional function to gather information relevant and material to its legislative inquiries.

As provided in Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, however, the power of legislative investigation is subject to three limitations: (1) the inquiry must be "in aid of legislation;" (2) the inquiry must be conducted in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure; and (3) "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."92 Also, where there is factual basis for the contempt, the resource person's detention should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry.93

Here, the Court finds that while satisfying the first two limitations, the Committee failed to accord petitioners their rights relative to the conduct of its proceedings. The scope and nature of these rights, as well as the Committee's violation thereof, is thoroughly addressed following the discussion of the first two limitations.

As earlier mentioned, PSR Nos. 858, 859, and 880, together with the privilege speech of Sen. Hontiveros,94 were filed and referred to the Committee which called for the conduct of an inquiry in aid of legislation.95 Notably, all these Senate Resolutions underscored that they are proposed precisely to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation as regards the vaccination program and procurement of COVID-19 Vaccines (PSR No. 858), COA findings on unspent and/or misused government funds (PSR No. 859), and payment claims issues between the Philhealth and private hospitals (PSR No. 880). The Subpoenae Ad Testificandium96 referred not only to the COA Report but also to PSR Nos. 858, 859 and 880, together with the privilege speech of Sen. Hontiveros.97

The Court has also held that Senate investigations of government transactions are proper exercises of the power of inquiry. Being related to the expenditure of public funds of which the Legislature is the guardian, such transactions involve government agencies created by the Legislature and officers, whose positions are within the power of Legislature to regulate or even abolish.98

The Court finds proper the Senate's explanation that because the National Expenditure Program (NEP) for 2022 had not yet been released by the DBM to the Legislature when the subject COA Report came out in July 2021, it was fitting that the Committee hear and investigate the findings in the COA Report on the DOH, as early as August 18, 2021. This was necessary to determine if the funds appropriated under Republic Act Nos. (RA) 1146999 and 11494100 for the COVID-19 pandemic were properly utilized. The inquiry of the Committee was necessary as the COA Report seemed to point out severe underutilization of funds, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance by government officials in the use of the DOH funds. Given this factual milieu, the hearings of the Committee, which began on August 18, 2021, were in aid of legislation because it investigated the use of funds appropriated in RAs 11469 and 11494, not only as part of its oversight function, but also to look into the proposed budget of the DOH for Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 which will eventually be contained in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) that will be enacted by the Legislature.101

Second Limitation: The assailed rules are compliant with the publication requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure of the Senate or the House of Representatives, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure.102

As a rule, the Legislature is given a wide latitude to enact its own rules in view of Section 16(3),103Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,104 the Court said:

This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.

x x x Further, pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.105 (Italics supplied.)

The rule, however, does not divest the Court of its expanded jurisdiction, i.e., the power to intervene whenever grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch—the Legislature or any of its Houses in this case, or instrumentality of government.106 The expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Court is encapsulated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Italics supplied.)

In Neri, the Court nullified the Senate Order, which cited Romulo L. Neri in contempt and directed his arrest and detention, after finding that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing such order. In that case, the Court noted that: (1) then Senate Blue Ribbon Committee violated the voting requirements under Section 18 of the Senate Rules on Inquiries because only a minority of the members were present during the deliberation; and (2) the Committee violated the publication requirement under the 1987 Constitution which requires that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure.

The Court finds that the circumstances in the instant case are different from those in the Neri case. Here, Section 18107 of the Senate Rules on Inquiries is compliant with the requirement under Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: that the rules governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate or the House of Representatives be duly published.

In the present case, the Senate Rules on Inquiries was unanimously adopted by the Senate as Resolution (Reso.) No. 5 on August 9, 2010 at a session where a quorum was present.108 Section 24 of Reso. No. 5, on Effectivity, states:

SEC 24. Effectivity. - These Rules shall take effect after seven (7) days following complete publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall remain in force until amended or repealed. A copy of these Rules shall be posted in the official website of the Senate of the Philippines.

The Senate Rules on Inquiries was then published in the August 11, 2010 issues of Malaya and Manila Bulletin, two (2) newspapers of general circulation.109 It was also posted in the Senate's website: www.senate.gov.ph. The rules took effect on August 18, 2010 and remained in force until amended.110

Section 18 of the Senate Rules on Inquiries was subsequently amended by Reso. No. 145 which was unanimously adopted by the Senate on February 6, 2013 at a session where a quorum was present.111 Reso. No. 145, states that the amendment to the Senate Rules on Inquiries "shall take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall remain in force until amended or repealed."112

Reso. No. 145 was published in the February 18, 2013 issues of the Manila Bulletin and Daily Tribune, two (2) newspapers of general circulation. It was also posted in the Senate's website.113

Simply stated, the adoption and amendment of the Senate Rules on Inquiries complied with the requirements of quorum, voting, and publication as stated in Reso. Nos. 5 and 145.

It bears emphasis that unlike the scenario in Neri, here, the Senate Rules on Inquiries and its amendments state that the rules "shall remain in force until amended or repealed."114 Thus, the Senate Rules on Inquiries remain effective although Reso. No. 5115 and Reso. No. 145, which amended Section 18, were adopted not by the present Senate 18th Congress but by its earlier counterparts.

Following the assailed rules, there was a quorum at the commencement of the hearings and acting throughout. On September 10, 2021, in particular, when the assailed Contempt Order was issued, those present at the start and throughout the proceedings were Sen. Pres. Sotto III, Senators Gordon, Villanueva, Lacson, Marcos, Hontiveros, Revilla, Pangilinan, Zubiri, Villar, Tolentino, Pacquiao, and Drilon.116 There were therefore more than seven Senators present. Such attendance was more than 1/3 of all the regular members plus its ex officio members as required under Section 4 of the Senate Rules.117

Third Limitation: The Committee failed to accord petitioners their Constitutional right to due process relative to the conduct of its proceedings. The Contempt Order dated September 10, 2021 finding that Ong and Yang testified falsely and evasively lacks factual basis.

As stated earlier, while the Committee satisfied the first and second constitutional limitations of its power to conduct the subject inquiry in aid of legislation, it failed to accord petitioners their rights in the conduct of its proceedings, more in the exercise of its contempt power. These rights refer to no other than those enshrined under the Bill of Rights, more particularly to the right to due process and the right against unreasonable seizures under Sections 1 and 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The violation and disregard of petitioners' rights were brought about by the Senate's exercise of its power of contempt punishing the act of "testifying falsely or evasively," under the assailed rules, the pertinent provisions of which read:

First, the Committee ascribed evasiveness to Ong in answering its queries relating to the following: the agreement between him and/or Pharmally, on the one hand, and Yang, on the other; and the payment made to the suppliers of PPEs and the nature of the agreement with said suppliers. The Committee referred to the excerpts of the September 10, 2021 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), as follows:

The Committee observed that Ong confessed that he and/or Pharmally had an agreement with Yang, but he could not remember the terms thereof. When asked to produce a copy of the agreement, he said that he would look for it.121

The Committee also concluded that Ong testified falsely in the course of the hearing of September 10, 2021, when he stated that Pharmally used its corporate funds to pay its suppliers before it was able to secure a loan. Sen. Drilon pointed out that Pharmally had no capacity to pay the initial order from its suppliers in the amount of ₱54 Million considering that Pharmally only had ₱625,000.00 as paid-up capital at the beginning of the year 2020; thus:

Evidently, the Committee was fixated on the fact that Pharmally had no capacity to pay the initial order of ₱54 Million, it having a paid-up capital of ₱625,000.00 only at the beginning of the year 2020. As can be gleaned from his testimony, however, Ong was able to subsequently aver that they had other funds sourced from the savings of the incorporators, and that they also borrowed money from friends. He even manifested his willingness to cooperate with the Anti-Money Laundering Council to explain where his friends got the funds.

Further, that Ong may have shown hesitancy in giving direct answers as regards the documents pertaining to the supplies of PPEs does not conclusively establish that he was evasive. The totality of his responses evince that he was mindful of his right against selfincrimination. Again, he manifested his willingness to cooperate in the investigation by committing to produce and submit documents required by the Committee.

As regards Yang, the Committee pointed out in its Comment dated February 19, 2022, his alleged questionable, incomplete, evasive and inconsistent answers or replies specifically as to his knowledge of Pharmally, thus:

For example, when asked as to when, how and why he became involved with Pharmally, he answered that he knows nothing about Pharmally and had nothing to do with it and that he came to know Pharmally only through the news. He replied that he had nothing to do with the registration, formation or operations of Pharrnally Pharmaceuticals. He said that he did not have business dealings with Mr. Linconn Ong, either in his personal capacity or as incorporator of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals. But as the questioning went on, he later admitted that Pharmally people like Mr. Ong and Mr. Garrick Hung approached him for assistance and that he introduced them to at least four (4) suppliers and helped them with the funding of their deal with the government. It was revealed that he acted as the financer or creditor of Pharmally and/or guarantor to the Chinese suppliers and also as the middleman or go-between the government and Pharmally. xx x.123

As keenly observed by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, even inconsistent answers were equated by the Committee with "testifying evasively."126 As he aptly pointed out, "[w]hether a witness genuinely did not know or did not recall the answer, or was evasive in answering a question is largely a matter of judgment or opinion."127 He further pointed out that "falsely or evasively" should be understood as "false" which means "not genuine, intentionally untrue, adjusted or made so as to deceive, intended or tending to mislead, not true, based on mistaken ideas, inconsistent with the facts."128 This determination requires "an assessment of the totality of the evidence presented to determine whether a witness speaks truthfully or merely trying to evade answering the question directly."129 Surely, this determination could not have been made on the basis of his testimony given in the hearing of September 10, 2021 alone.130

Evidently, Sen. Lacson's series of repetitive questions as regards Yang's knowledge of Pharmally evoked different answers. However, the fact that Yang made inconsistent or incomplete answers in the course of his testimony does not conclusively establish that he was evasive within the context of contempt, that is, there was refusal or unwillingness to testify on his part. While Yang initially tried to avoid giving any leading information as regards his connection with Pharmally, he was able to subsequently aver in the course of the proceedings that he introduced the suppliers of facemasks and PPEs to Ong. Again, the Committee immediately surmised on the incredulity of his testimony, thus citing him in contempt and ordering his arrest on the ground that he gave inconsistent or incomplete answers.

In Bro. Oca v. Custodio,131 the Court classified punishment for contempt in judicial proceedings into civil and criminal. This is anchored on the two-fold aspect of contempt which seeks to (1) compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform; and (2) punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders.132 The characterization of the proceedings is "determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose."133 Under the second aspect, judicial contempt proceedings are characterized as criminal or punitive:

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.134 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Following the above characterization, a legislative contempt is essentially criminal or punitive in nature. Notably, the contumacious act of testifying falsely or evasively finds criminal definition under Article 183135 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) penalizing false testimony and perjury. In the case, the Committee's treatment of petitioners' supposed contumacious acts as criminal in nature is even bolstered when it ordered their arrest and, worse, the subsequent transfer of Ong to the Pasay City Jail. Indeed, the power to punish crimes is punitive in nature as it involves a proceeding brought by the State before the courts to punish offenders.136

It bears underscoring that the purpose of the Committee's proceedings is to conduct an inquiry or investigation to aid the Senate in crafting relevant legislation, and not to conduct a trial or make an adjudication. Legislative inquiries do not share the same goals as the criminal trial process,137 and "cannot be punitive in the sense that they cannot result in legally binding deprivation of a person's life, liberty or property."138 Thus, punishment for legislative contempt, albeit sui generis in character, must similarly observe the minimum requirements of due process.

As succinctly pointed out by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, witnesses who are charged by Congress with "giving false or evasive testimony" must be accorded stricter due process requirements, such as the opportunity to explain one's side before being penalized, consistent with the due process safeguards used in criminal proceedings. Considering the broad definition of "giving false or evasive testimony," the witness must, at the very least, given a chance to explain why his or her testimony is not false or evasive.139

In the case, the Committee's grave abuse of discretion lay in its precipitate act of citing petitioners Ong and Yang in contempt and ordering their arrests without giving them the opportunity to be heard.

Let it be clarified that the Court's finding of grave abuse of discretion in the case—the Committee's failure to accord petitioners their Constitutional right to due process relative to the conduct of its proceedings—does not lead to an invalidation of the Legislature's implicit authority to make a determination whether a person is "testifying falsely or evasively."

Ong argues that the Senate Rules of Procedure on Inquiries is vague for having no clear standards as to what constitutes "testifying falsely or evasively."140 He insists that the phrase "testifying falsely or evasively" is utterly vague as it does not fairly notify the witness of how it can be committed, nor does it restrict in any manner the discretion of the Senate Committee to adjudge an act as falling within its ambit.141

Further, Ong maintains that the determination of whether a witness testifies falsely or evasively falls exclusively within the ambit of judicial power. For Ong, the question of falsity of an utterance is a highly evidentiary matter and its determination requires the stringent application of the rules on evidence.

Implicit in the Legislature's power to punish recalcitrant witnesses by declaring them in contempt is the power to determine whether the witness is recalcitrant or is guilty of contumacious acts. As the grant of legislative power which includes the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is intended to be complete—i.e., without need to resort to judicial process in order that the Legislature may be able to perform its function—it follows that the Legislature likewise has the power to resort to mechanisms to obey its processes. As in the case, the Legislature has the power to determine whether a witness is testifying falsely or evasively and, consequently, declare a witness in contempt with the end that the witness may be compelled to purge his or her contempt by giving a truthful testimony.

It must be emphasized that the Legislature, considering the statements as well as the actuations of the witness, is by no means helpless in determining whether a witness is testifying falsely or evasively. The varying levels of ease or difficulty by which the Legislature may make such determination on a case-to-case basis does not lead to the conclusion that it should solely belong to the courts. When a witness' testimony is glaringly false or when his/her answers are evasive, the Court will not prevent the Legislature from exercising its power just because the courts may also punish false testimony as a violation of penal laws. If at all, the Court in certain instances can only consider the Legislature to have ruled whimsically or arbitrarily if its finding that a witness testified falsely or evasively is evidently without basis. It does not, however, lead to an invalidation of the Legislature's implicit authority to make such determination.

Contrary to Ong's proposition, the phrase "testifying falsely or evasively" is not vague.

A statute or act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.142 In such instance, it is unconstitutional based on two grounds: "(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."143

However, the Court has stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, i.e., not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.144 "Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions."145

In the case, the Court finds that the phrase "testifies falsely or evasively" in Section 18 of the Senate Rules on Inquiries is not vague.

False testimony has been defined in several provisions of the RPC.146 It is committed by any person who, being under oath, and required to testify as to the truth of certain matter at a hearing before a competent authority, shall deny the truth or say something contrary to it.147

A false statement is a statement that is known or believed by its maker to be incorrect or untrue and is made especially with intent to deceive or mislead.148 It is also defined as one made knowingly false or made recklessly without honest belief in its truth, and within the purpose to mislead or deceive.149

On the other hand, an evasive answer refers to a response that is given, which does not directly answer the question posed.150 Evasive answers are often seen in the legal world when a party refuses to conf rm or deny allegation(s) against him or her.151 An evasive answer is likewise defined as "one which consists in refusing either to admit or to deny a matter in a direct, straightforward manner as to which a person is necessarily presumed to have knowledge."152

As early as 1950, the Court, in Arnault, already pronounced that a testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.153 Thus, in Arnault, the Court recognized the power of the Senate and its committees to cite a witness in contempt for testifying falsely and evasively during an inquiry.

In People v. Saure,154 the Court considered a testimony of a witness as evasive when he did not remember the facts which he ought to know because they were related to his own self-serving allegation.

There is no doubt that the phrase "testifies falsely or evasively" can be understood by any person of common knowledge or intelligence.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of the Senate Committee in Requesting for the Issuance of a Lookout Bulletin

In a Letter155 dated September 13, 2021 addressed to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Committee, through Sen. Gordon, requests that Yang be "placed on the Bureau of Immigration Hold Departure Order, Watch List, or Lookout Bulletin, whichever is appropriate, and that the Committee be informed whenever he is about to leave, or whenever he arrives from without the country."156

Yang ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the Committee in "causing the issuance of a lookout order," invoking the absence of any criminal charge filed in court against him. Characterizing the letter-request as a directive to Immigration Commissioner Jaime H. Morente, Yang contended that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation does not grant the Senate or any of its Committees the power to request for a Hold Departure Order, Watch List, or Lookout Bulletin. Thus, Yang questions the legality of the request.

In its comment, the OSG confirms that Justice Secretary Menardo Guevarra acted on the request and issued an immigration lookout bulletin order (ILBO) against Yang on or about September 14, 2021. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Senate Committee only made a request. It bears underscoring that the DOI and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) are not impleaded in this case. Indeed, the Court cannot pass upon the propriety of the ILBO issued by Secretary Guevarra without violating the requirements of fair play and due process.157 Suffice it to state that the questioned act of the Senate Committee pertains to a mere request, which cannot be legally considered as the authority or basis for the issuance by the DOI of the ILBO. Being a mere request, the same may or may not be heeded by the DOI. Contrary to Yang's proposition, the request does not partake of a directive or order mandating the DOI to issue the ILBO, from which grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the Senate.

In any event, the Court had the occasion of addressing a similar invocation against requests for assistance of the BI made by the Senate in the conduct of legislative investigations. In Standard Chartered Bank, the Court held:

[I]t is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering that most of the officers of SCB Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade the compulsive character of respondent's summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said witnesses fom evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying petitioners' inten ed travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them.158 (Italics supplied; citation omitted.)

Thus, far from acting with grave abuse of discretion, the Senate has legal and factual reasons to request for the DOJ to place Yang under a lookout bulletin.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of the Senate Committee in Compelling Yang to Answer Questions and to Submit Documents and Information Pertaining to Him, His Property and Business Interests

Yang admits that the Senate certainly has the right to investigate the possible abuse or misuse of government funds in relation to the enactment of RA 11469. However, he posits that the Senate Committee is engaged in a fishing expedition by asking for documents about his properties and business dealings.159

More pmticularly, Yang argues that the Senate Committee committed grave abuse of discretion as it compelled him to answer questions and submit documents that are beyond the scope of the legislative inquiry and in clear violation of his right to privacy.160 He asserts that the Senate Committee directed him to provide information on his non-filing of income tax return, studies, and length of stay in the Philippines.161 He also contends that questions regarding his past are outside the scope of the Senate investigation, and that he, nonetheless, complied with the order to bring the documents to avoid being cited in contempt under the misguided notion that he was being evasive.162

It is settled that in the absence of information pertinent to a contemplated legislation, the Congress will not be able to fully and effectively perform its function to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

In this regard, the Congress makes use of compulsory process to gather material information for its inquiry but such exercise must be in accordance with its rules of procedure and must take into account the rights of those affected or appearing during inquiries in aid of legislation.

In the case of Yang, the Court is unconvinced that his right to privacy was violated when the Senate Committee directed him to produce the subject documents.

First, in Standard Chartered Bank, the Court stressed that the right to privacy is not an absolute right. While the Constitution guarantees the respect of persons affected by a legislative inquiry under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, not every assertion of one's right to privacy must be allowed to prevent a legitimate legislative inquiry.

Too, in Sabio, the Court elucidated that the right to privacy is recognized and protected by laws. Any intrusion to one's right to privacy is not allowed unless it is excused by law and in accordance with established legal process. Definitely, '"no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his [or her] privacy' and 'everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."'163 In that case, the Court explained that in resolving whether a person's right to privacy was violated, a court must determine two important questions: (1) did the concerned person exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) did the government violate such expectation?

In the case of Yang, the foregoing questions are answered in the negative as there is absence of an arbitrary intrusion to his right to privacy.

To underscore, central to the inquiry in aid of legislation and of which Yang was invited by the Senate is his alleged participation in the Pharmally controversy.1aшphi1 In this regard, the Senate Committee's inquiry covers the acts of Yang related to the contemplated legislation to improve government procurement procedure and processes in relation to RA 11494. It follows that the presentation of documents with regard to Yang's properties and business interests is allowed as it is intimately related to the issue of whether he acquired and/or accumulated wealth in connection with the subject government funds.

Yang therefore had no reasonable expectations of privacy over matters relating to Pharmally and his business interests therein as the government itself has an interest insofar as the Congress contemplates the enactment and/or amendment of a law relating government procurement law. While there must be ideally a balance between the interest of resource persons and the demand by the Congress for information, the right to privacy cannot prevail where there is an overriding compelling state interest, as in the present case.

In other words, the right to privacy of Yang cannot prevail over the compelling state interest as the Senate Committee conducts inquiries anent a contemplated legislation relating to RA No. 11494. The purpose of the inquiry of the Senate to resolve the misuse of government funds in connection with the pandemic response of the government is a compelling state reason for it to proceed with its inquiry and require Yang to produce the subject documents.

Second, pieces of information which relate to personal circumstances are not by themselves beyond the scope of legislative inquiry especially so where, as above stated, a contemplated legislation is being considered by the Congress. Verily, in the absence of showing that the production of the subject documents will in any way prejudice Yang, his contention that his right to privacy was violated remains as a bare allegation without proof supporting the claim.

Third, Yang failed to convince the Court of any recognized public interest in the confidentiality of the information asked by the Senate Committee. In fact, he did not assail at the outset and before the Senate the obligatory force of the subpoena duces tecum it issued against him. In contrast, Yang himself admitted having complied with the subpoena and brought the subject documents when he appeared before the Senate Committee. In the absence of a formal and proper invocation by Yang of his right to privacy before the Senate, stating the specific reasons for the preservation of the confidentiality of the information being asked from him as a resource person, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the Senate in directing him to produce the subject documents.164

All told, the Court finds that the Senate Committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction only insofar as it issued the assailed Contempt Order dated September 10, 2021, citing Ong and Yang in contempt for testifying falsely or evasively and ordering their arrest.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The Order dated September 10, 2021, citing petitioners Linconn Uy Ong and Michael Yang Hong Ming in contempt of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and directing their arrest, is NULLIFIED for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The phrase "testifies falsely or evasively" both under Section 18 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, as amended, and Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, on the basis of the challenges raised in these petitions, is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Hernando, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

Leonen *SAJ (on official leave but left a vote). See separate concurring opinion.