[ G.R. No. 253686, June 29, 2021 ]
IRENE S. ROSARIO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
I agree with the ponencia, but I write to emphasize that a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases is rightfully to be determined from the actual and real prejudice caused by the delay to the defendant who, because of the lapse of time, can no longer prepare an intelligent defense.
This case involves the disallowance issued by the Commission on Audit (COA) against the procurement by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) of modular workstations through direct contracting. I note the following timeline of events in this case based on the ponencia:
March 2, 2005 Modular workstations delivered by the contractor
June 14, 2005 State Auditor issued an Audit Observation Memorandum containing observations on the procurement of the workstations
October 31, 2006 Notice of Disallowance (ND) issued by the COA; Irene S. Rosario (petitioner) was made liable under the ND as a member of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), which recommended that the project be done through direct contracting from an exclusive distributor
May 31, 2007 Petitioner sought reconsideration of the ND, arguing that the role of the BAC is merely recommendatory
August 5, 2008 COA Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO-Corporate) issued a decision exonerating the members of the BAC except Milagros Balteza (Balteza), chief of the ECC's Finance and Administrative Division, who appealed the decision of the LAO-Corporate
January 7, 2015 Petitioner received a copy of COA Commission Proper (COA Proper) Decision dated November 11, 2014, reinstating her liability under the ND
January 23, 2015 Petitioner sought reconsideration of the COA Proper Decision
January 28, 2020 COA Proper issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
Applying the so-called "balancing test," the ponencia aptly discusses that the COA Proper unduly delayed in its resolution of the case, given that it took six (6) years to reinstate petitioner's liability (and this despite the fact that she did not appeal from the LAO-Corporate decision exculpating her), and took another five (5) years to resolve her timely-filed motion for reconsideration.
I agree.
Indeed, the COA did not adequately discharge its burden to justify its delays.ℒαwρhi৷ It merely argued that it needed time to pass upon the issues raised by Balteza on appeal, despite eventually finding that her appeal was just a rehash of her arguments against the ND. It is important to stress that, following the Court's ruling in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division1 (Cagang), since the delay undoubtedly extended beyond the reasonable time periods to resolve cases and appeals — as the delays extended to years — then the burden shifts to the State to prove that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay. Said burden, however, was not sufficiently discharged in this case.
I likewise concur with the ponencia as it acknowledges that petitioner timely asserted her right to speedy disposition of cases when she filed a motion for reconsideration of the COA Proper's decision sixteen (16) days after receipt thereof.
More than the foregoing, however, I strongly and wholeheartedly agree with the finding that the COA's delay caused undue prejudice to petitioner because it "impeded her ability to raise a complete defense against her supposed liability."2 As I had stated in my Opinion in Cagang,, [p]rejudice is more real in the form of denial of access to documents or witnesses that have been buried or forgotten by time, and in one's failure to recall the events due to the inordinately long period that had elapsed since the acts that give rise to the criminal prosecution. Inordinate delay is clearly prejudicial when it impairs one's ability to mount a complete and effective defense."3
Applying the above in the present case, it is worth emphasizing that petitioner resigned from her post after she was exonerated by the LAO-Corporate on August 6, 2008 due to the untimely death of her husband and the need to relocate to the province in order to take care of her children.4 Due to her separation from service, petitioner no longer had access to the BAC documents relevant to the procurement subject of the disallowance. Throughout the six (6) years that passed before the COA Proper reinstated her liability, petitioner had no notice whatsoever of any developments in the proceedings, nor indeed that the case was even subsisting.5
Relevantly, the General Records Disposition Schedule, series 2009, issued by the National Archives of the Philippines (NAP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 9470,6 prescribes an authorized retention period of only five (5) years after contract termination or settlement for BAC files, which include abstracts, invitations, minutes, pre/post qualification documents, publications, and resolutions.7 At the end of this retention period, BAC files are already deemed valueless records8 and are ready for disposal or destruction.9 In this case, by the time the COA reinstated petitioner's liability under the ND, almost ten (10) years had already passed from the delivery of the modular workstations on March 2, 2005. Certainly, the CPA's delay of six (6) years hindered, if not rendered impossible, petitioner's preparation of an adequate defense against the ND.
The foregoing points make it painfully clear that unreasonable delay by government agencies in the disposition of cases necessarily prejudices the rights of respondents before them to the point of suffering injustice. The longer a case lies in wait for its resolution, the longer will the relevant documents and other evidence be subject to all kinds of risks and possibilities of destruction or loss — whether through natural calamity, man-made disasters, or even by operation of our laws. These risks are present no matter what stage in the proceedings the delay occurs. This is why I believe, and have repeatedly stressed in similar cases,10 that the element of prejudice should be the prime consideration in determining whether there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.
Accordingly, I concur with the ponencia and vote to GRANT the petition.
Footnotes
1 G.R. Nos 206438 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018, 875 SCRA 374.
2 Ponencia, p. 14.
3 Supra note 1, at 473. Emphasis supplied.
4 Ponencia, p. 14.
5 Id. at 13.
6 NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES ACT OF 2007, approved on May 21, 2007.
7 The General Records Disposition Schedule is made part of the Guidelines on the Disposal of Valueless Records in Government Agencies, NAP General Circular No. 02-09, January 20, 2009.
8 NAP General Circular No. 02-09, January 20, 2009, Guidelines on the Disposal of Valueless Records in Government Agencies, Article II, Rule 2.
9 Id., Article III Rule 3.2.
10 See Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, Sixth Division, GR. No. 238579-80, July 24, 2019, 910 SCRA 438; Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, supra note 1.
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