A.C. No. 5279 - Separate Opinion




A.C. No. 5279, September 8, 2020, ♦ Decision, Per Curiam ♦ Separate Opinion, Caguioa, [J] [ A.C. No. 5279, September 08, 2020 ] ROMEO TELLES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROGELIO P. DANCEL, RESPONDENT. SEPARATE OPINION CAGUIOA, J.: The ponencia adopts the findings of the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) but imposes a stiffer penalty against Atty. Rogelio P. Dancel (respondent), ruling as follows: WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Dancel is hereby DISBARRED for violating Rule 12.03, Canon 12 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.1 At the outset, I express my agreement with the ponencia in finding respondent liable for violating Canon 12,2 Rule 12.03,3 Canon 18,4 and Rule 18.045 the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent's propensity for filing motions for extension of time to file pleadings and then not filing the same, and his blatant disregard of the lawful orders of the Court warrant a finding of administrative liability against him. Undoubtedly, respondent violated his duties toward his client as well as to the Court, for which he must be held accountable. Be that as it may, the recommended penalty by the OBC of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years appears more appropriate than disbarment which is too harsh a penalty. It has been ruled that "[d]isbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. Undoubtedly, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. These penalties are imposed with great caution, because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and their consequences are beyond repair."6 On whether the Court will impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, I am of the position that a clear bright line must be drawn between 1) lawyers who patently and unashamedly commit offenses that are, by themselves, gross because they are also violative of penal laws; and 2) those who commit offenses which ostensibly pale in comparison with the first. To illustrate, the first category would include such transgressions rising to the level of committing bigamy, siring illegitimate children with multiple women, and shameless continuous philandering. These acts indubitably show a degree of immorality deserving of the ultimate penalty of disbarment, especially considering that bigamy amounts to a crime. In contrast, while respondent's transgressions in the instant case are serious, his acts still fall under the second category; hence, it does not rise up to the level which necessitates his disbarment. To be sure, the Court is vested with the authority and discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere suspension against a lawyer who commits any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (j) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.7 Nevertheless, the Court is given leeway to impose the lesser penalty of suspension if it would achieve the "desired [end] of reforming the errant lawyer,"8 based on its appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, the Court may exercise restraint in its imposition of penalties, should the circumstances of the case warrant, especially if the errant lawyer did not willfully commit a misconduct that is tantamount to, if not clearly, a grievous criminal act.Ꮮαwρhi৷ As applied to the instant case, I am of the view that sanctioning respondent with the less severe penalty of suspension than disbarment achieves the ends of the disciplinary proceeding which is to penalize an erring lawyer and to preserve the integrity of the legal profession. The period of three years is a very long period already, and suffices, to my mind, to instill in respondent the gravity of his misdeeds. IN VIEW THEREOF, I vote to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Dancel FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF THREE (3) YEARS for violating Canon 12, Rule 12.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Footnotes 1 Ponencia, pp. 8-9. 2 CANON 12 — A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 3 RULE 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. 4 CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. 5 RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. 6 Palalan Carp Farmers Multi-Purpose Coop v. Dela Rosa, A.C. No. 12008, August 14, 2019, accessed at . 7 Anacta v. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012, 678 SCRA 352, 361. 8 Arma v. Montevilla, A.C. No. 4829, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 1, 10. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation