G.R. No. 237489 - Concurring Opinion




G.R. No. 237489, August 27, 2020, ♦ Decision, Peralta, [CJ] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J] [ G.R. No. 237489, August 27, 2020 ] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. DOMINGO ARCEGA Y SIGUENZA, RESPONDENT. CONCURRING OPINION CAGUIOA, J.: Respondent was charged and convicted by the trial court with the crime, of attempted rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified respondent's conviction to acts of lasciviousness. Petitioner People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing respondent's acquittal for the crime of attempted rape. The ponencia denies the petition ruling that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper procedure to assail the CA's Decision. The ponencia stressed that with the CA's modification of respondent's conviction from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness, respondent had already been acquitted of attempted rape. Hence, the OSG may assail such acquittal only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.1 I concur with the denial of the petition. The acquittal of respondent for the crime of attempted rape generally may not be assailed without violating his right against double jeopardy. I submit this Concurring Opinion to stress that the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, as discussed by the ponencia, is a very narrow exception, as held by existing jurisprudence, which does not arise in this case. In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than that "a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation."2 This is referred to as the finality-of-acquittal rule.3 Such rule proceeds from the constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused against double jeopardy,4 which safeguards that accused from government oppression of being prosecuted twice for the same offense. In People v. Velasco,5 the Court explained the rationale for the rule: It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." (sic) The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a pat1icular tribunal.Ꮮαwρhi৷ This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. (sic) As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) This iron clad rule has, as its only exception, the grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited to the case where there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due process when it is denied the opportunity to present evidence or where the trial is a sham, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.7 The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan8 (Galman) presents the foremost example of the exception to the rule on double jeopardy. In Galman, the judgment of acquittal was remanded to the trial court after the Court found that the trial conducted was a mockery - a sham. The Court found that the then President had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the case, and that the prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case of total absolution of all the accused of all criminal and civil liability.9 Due to the influence that the Executive exerted over the independence o the court trying the case, the Court ruled that the decision acquitting the accused issued in that case was issued in violation of the prosecution's due process. The factors the Court considered in making this exception were (1) suppression of evidence, (2) harassment of witnesses, (3) deviation from the regular raffle procedure in the assignment of the case, (4) close monitoring and supervision of the Executive and its officials over the case, and (5) secret meetings held between and among the President, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, and the Tanodbayan. From the foregoing, the Court saw the trial as a sham. Thus, the Court ruled in Galman that the right against double jeopardy, absolute as it may appear, may be invoked only when there was a valid judgment terminating the first jeopardy. The Court explained that no right attaches from a void judgment, and hence the right against double jeopardy may not be invoked when the decision that "terminated" the first jeopardy was invalid and issued without jurisdiction.10 The facts of Galman constitute the very narrow exception to the application of the right against double jeopardy. The unique fact surrounding Galman - and other similar scenarios where the denial of due process on the part of the prosecution was so gross and palpable - is the limited area where an acquittal may be revisited through a petition for certiorari. Thus, in People v. Tria-Tirona,11 the Court held: x x x In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process. From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be involved is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.12 (Emphasis supplied) Further, in PeopLe v. Court of Appeals, Fourth Division,13 the Court explained that: x x x [F]or an acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. "Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantlv abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice." (Citations omitted) The petition is bereft of any allegation, much less, evidence that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or the proceedings before the CA were a mockery such that Ando's acquittal was a foregone conclusion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the interpretation of the applicable law or appreciation of evidence that the CA may have committed in ordering Ando's acquittal, absent any showing that the CA acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of due process, the CA's findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed and set aside without violating the rule against double jeopardy. x x x14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Verily, this means that not every error in the trial or evaluation of the evidence by the court in question that led to the acquittal of the accused would be reviewable by certiorari. As the Court ruled in Republic v. Ang Cho Kio,15 "[n]o error, however, flagrant, committed by the court against the state, can be reserved by it for decision by the supreme court when the defendant has once been placed in jeopardy and discharged, even though the discharge was the result of the error committed."16 As applied in this case, it is immaterial whether the trial court was correct in convicting respondent for attempted rape or whether the CA committed error, no matter how flagrant or grave, in its appreciation of the evidence presented by the prosecution for the court to modify respondent's conviction for a lesser offense. The fact remains that respondent's right against double jeopardy had already attached when the CA acquitted respondent for the crime of attempted rape. Hence, no amount of error of judgment will ripen into an error of jurisdiction such that the acquittal would be reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari. It is only when the case falls within the narrow confines of jurisprudential exception - like in Galman where the State was deprived of its day in court - that a decision acquitting the accused may be revisited. This is clearly not obtaining in this case. Thus, in light of the foregoing considerations, I vote to DENY the petition. Footnotes 1 Ponencia, pp. 10-11. 2 Chiok v. People, G.R. Nos. 179814 & 180021, December 7, 2015, 776 SCRA 120, 137. 3 Id. 4 Mandagan v. Jose M. Valero Corp., G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019, accessed at . 5 G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, 340 SCRA 207. 6 Id. at 240-241. 7 Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 94, 109, citing People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140633, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 74, 78-79. 8 G.R. No. L-72670, September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43. 9 Id. at 87. 10 Id. 11 G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 462. 12 Id. at 469. 13 G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 575. 14 Id. at 579-580. 15 G.R. Nos. L-6687 y L-6688, July 29, 1954, 95 Phil. 475. 16 Id. at 480; emphasis and underscoring supplied. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation