DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
The Regional Trial Court declared void the marriage of Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol) and Felipe Impas (Felipe) due to Felipe's psychological incapacity.1 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed and set aside2 the Regional Trial Court Decision3 and held that Mirasol failed to sufficiently prove that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.4
The ponencia affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.5 It held that the totality of evidence offered by Mirasol failed to substantiate Felipe's alleged psychological incapacity and its relation to his "early life."6 Although Dr.
Shiela Marie Montefalcon's7 (Dr. Montefalcon) psychological evaluation report explained the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, this Court found that it fell short of the necessary proof to declare the marriage void.8 As Dr. Montefalcon admitted that she evaluated Felipe's psychological condition based on the information given by Mirasol and the couple's common friend, her evaluation report failed to "provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol 's one-sided assertion."9 Thus, the ponencia concluded:
As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the subject himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable. We are not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence. Based on the records, this Court finds that there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe's sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated with psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. We reiterate that there was no other evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the [Court of Appeals] against the dissolution and nullity of the parties' marriage due to insufficiency of the evidence presented. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.10 (Citations omitted)
I disagree. Mirasol has sufficiently proven that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated. The totality of evidence confirms that Felipe's marital infidelity is a manifestation of a grave psychological order, which renders him incapable of fulfilling his essential marital obligations.
I
The evidence presented by Mirasol mainly consisted of her testimony and Dr. Montefalcon's psychological evaluation report.11 The ponencia found that apart from these, no other dependable evidence was offered to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a manifestation of a "grave, deeply rooted[,] and incurable" personal disorder.12 Furthermore, it pointed out that the trial court's decision mainly relied on Dr. Montefalcon's psychological evaluation.13 The trial court failed to assess the veracity of the allegations contained in the report, as well as the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence offered.14 Hence, "there were no factual findings [that] can serve as bases for its conclusion" that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated.15
The courts, in determining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment, must essentially "rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter."16 Courts are "not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology"; resorting to expert opinion enables them to reach an "intelligent and judicious" ruling.17
In her psychological evaluation report, Dr. Montefalcon concluded that Felipe was suffering from narcissistic personality disorder.18 This condition was ingrained from Felipe's "poor parental and family molding," which caused him to "develop a defective superego and gross disregard for the feelings of others, particularly his wife."19 Thus:
The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an early onset, with an enduring pattern and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. His poor parental and family molding (particularly lack of parental parenting) caused him to have a defective superego and he proved to be [a] selfish, immature and negligent person and followed a pattern of gross irresponsibility and gross disregard of the feelings of his partner/wife[,] disregarding the marriage contract and the commitment he agreed on [sic] during the wedding. In other words, the root cause of respondent's flawed personality pattern can be in childhood milieu. Respondent's familial constellation, unreliable parenting style from significant figures around him, and unfavorable childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his environment in general. The respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope with his obligations and responsibilities as married man and father.
It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the normative and ordinary duties of marriage and family, shouldered by any married man, existing in ordinary circumstances. He just cannot perform his duties and obligations as a husband, as he entered into marriage for his own self-satisfaction and gratification, manipulate[d] and denigrate[d] the petitioner for his own pleasures and satisfaction. In the process, respondent was unable to assume his marital duties and responsibilities to his wife. He failed to render mutual help and support.
Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has no psychological insight that he has a character problem. He would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people around him. People suffering from this personality disorder are unmotivated to treatment and impervious to recovery. There are no medications and laboratory examinations to be taken for maladaptive behavior such as the NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder).
Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and pervasive[,] affecting many aspects of his life, such as social functioning and close relationships. Apparently, he has failed to develop appropriate adjustment methods. He lacks the intrapersonal and interpersonal integration that caused him the failure to understand the very nature of that sharing of life that is directed toward the solidarity and formation of family.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Dr. Montefalcon's expert testimony was consistent with the undisputed facts evincing Felipe's incapability to fulfill his essential marital obligations to Mirasol.
Mirasol and Felipe started as good friends as their parents were business partners.21 During their courtship, Mirasol found out that Felipe maintained an affair with his former girlfriend. This caused their relationship to be tumultuous, and it was only after their parents' intervention that they reconciled and got married.22 After 13 years of marriage, Felipe began philandering again. Even their friends and relatives saw him with other women. On one instance, Mirasol returned home from a trip to surprise her family but, to her dismay, she caught Felipe "in a compromising act with another woman."23 This prompted Mirasol to leave their conjugal dwelling and file a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court.24
Felipe's continuous philandering, despite his being married and having children, shows a grave and incurable psychological incapacity that warrants the dissolution of his marriage with Mirasol. Moreover, his indifference about being seen publicly by friends and relatives with other women, as well as engaging in a compromising act with a woman not his wife, shows his utter disregard for Mirasol's feelings.
In this case, even without Dr. Montefalcon's evaluation report, the undisputed narrative of events offered by Mirasol undoubtedly points to the conclusion that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated. Felipe's acts-which already left traces even during the inception of their marriage-are indicative of a disordered personality. This makes him incapable of fulfilling his essential marital obligations25 embodied in the Family Code, thus:
Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
. . . .
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(7) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(8) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(9) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
Contrary to the ponencia, the trial court did not "heavily rel[y] on the result" of Dr. Montefalcon's evaluation report, which allegedly lacked "factual findings which can serve as bases" for concluding that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated.26 The totality of evidence presented by Mirasol is more than enough to prove Felipe's psychological incapacity. Hence, Mirasol and Felipe's marriage is void under Article 3627 of the Family Code.
II
Dr. Montefalcon's admission that she evaluated Felipe's psychological condition indirectly from the testimonies of Mirasol and the couple's common friend should not discredit her evaluation as expert testimony.
In Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes,28 this Court underscored that the lack of examination of the party afflicted with a personality disorder neither discredits a doctor's testimony nor renders his or her findings as hearsay:
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties' marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent's pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.29 (Emphasis supplied)
The interview conducted by Dr. Montefalcon with Mirasol to indirectly evaluate Felipe's psychological condition should not be set aside. Because of the intimate nature of marriage, Mirasol knows best whether Felipe has fulfilled his marital obligations as well as his responsibilities to his children.
Psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage may be ascertained through the totality of evidence offered.30 That the respondent should be examined by a physician or psychologist is neither a necessity nor a conditio sine qua non for a declaration of nullity.31
For this reason, the ponencia cannot readily conclude that Dr. Montefalcon's psychological evaluation report lacks the "evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's one-sided assertion."32 As the totality of evidence is sufficient to substantiate Felipe's psychological incapacity, Dr. Montefalcon's evaluation report has become unnecessary. Nonetheless, Mirasol went beyond what is required of her when she substantiated her claims through Dr. Montefalcon's evaluation report.
Furthermore, I emphasize that Felipe failed to participate in the proceedings. Despite valid service of summons, he did not even bother to file any responsive pleading.33 Similarly, Mirasol asserted that Felipe was sent a letter of request for psychological tests.34 The request was left unheeded.35 Despite Mirasol's efforts to compel Felipe to participate in the proceedings, Felipe remained unresponsive. Hence, Felipe's refusal to be examined should not be taken against Mirasol.
III
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after its celebration.
The term "psychological incapacity" was not explicitly defined in the Family Code.36 The Family Code Revision Committee intended not to give examples for fear that it "would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis."37 The Committee also decided to accept the provision "with less specificity than expected" for the law to allow "some resiliency in its application."38
Therefore, each case involving the application of Article 36 must be specifically regarded and ruled on "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations" but based on its own associated facts.39 Courts should construe the provision "on a case-to case-basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."40
However, "psychological incapacity" does not mean to grasp "all such possible cases of psychoses."41 The ponencia, citing Santos v. Court of Appeals,42 reiterated that "psychological incapacity" deliberately pertains to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."43 Similarly, it cited Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio44 and enumerated the following characterizations of psychological incapacity:
(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.45 (Emphasis in the original)
The guidelines in interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, as provided for in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,46 are reiterated and applied in this case. Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity ....
. . . .
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision ....
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage ....
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex ....
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.1âwphi1 Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children ....
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts ....
. . . .
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state[.]47 (Emphasis in the original)
Contrary to the supposed resilient application of Article 36, Ngo-Te v. Yu-te48compared the rigid guidelines in Molina to a "strait-jacket."49 Thus:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.50 (Citations omitted)
Likewise, Ngo-Te underscored that in dissolving marriages due to psychological incapacity, this Court is not destroying the foundation of families. Rather, it is protecting the sanctity of marriages:
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.51
Thus, Ngo-Te explicitly provides that it does not, in any way, propose the abandonment of the guidelines provided for under Molina.52 It reiterates that the necessity to consider other perspectives in disposing cases under Article 36 exists.53
The recent case of Ka/aw v. Fernandez54 is instructive, in that Article 36 of the Family Code must not be strictly and literally read as to give way for the real intention of its drafters:
The foregoing guidelines [in Molina] have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.55
It is imperative upon this Court to annul the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe. Mirasol admitted that she was happy when she married Felipe.56 Although she once discovered that Felipe had been keeping his affair with his former girlfriend, she had hopes that Felipe would reform from his old ways.57 However, Felipe continued womanizing after Mirasol gave birth to their daughter.58
I have had the privilege to emphasize in Matudan v. Republic:59
The effects of applying the rigid Article 36 guidelines does not negate the compassion that some of the Members of this Court may have for the parties. Still, it is time that this Court operate within the sphere of reality. The law is an instrument to provide succor. It is not a burden that unreasonably interferes with individual choices of intimate arrangements.
The choice to stay in or leave a marriage is not for this Court, or the State, to make. The choice is given to the partners, with the Constitution providing that "[t]he right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and demands of responsible parenthood[.]" Counterintuitively, the State protects marriage if it allows those found to have psychological illnesses that render them incapable of complying with their marital obligations to leave the marriage. To force partners to stay in a loveless marriage, or a spouseless marriage as in this case, only erodes the foundation of a family.60 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
I cannot join the majority's reading of the law as it condemns loveless married couples to a life of pain and suffering.1âwphi1 The law should not be read as too callous or cruel that it forever condemns those who may have made very human errors in choosing those with whom they should be intimate. For the State to enforce this cruelty is the very antithesis of the freedoms embodied in many provisions of our Constitution.
Marriage is a struggle. In some cases, fortunate couples discover that they become better together. They learn that their compromises make them grow further.
However, there are others who discover that marriage creates a bond that magnifies their differences. Irreconcilable differences make every moment of eternal bondage excruciating. The State, through the courts, do not add any new factor in a couple's intimate relationship when it denies petitions for declarations of nullity in failed marriages. The State leaves its citizens in a perpetual state of misery and places multiple hardships on a couple and their children.
Felipe's continuous philandering, albeit having his own family, manifests an incurable psychological disorder of utmost gravity. If Felipe's sexual infidelity were merely caused by his "refusal or unwillingness"61 to assume his marital obligations, then he would not have been indifferent about being seen publicly with the other women with whom he had other affairs. What Felipe has done apparently caused much pain to his family and should be put to an end. It is cruel for this Court to rule that Mirasol should remain married to Felipe.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina interpreted Article 36 of the Family Code to introduce restrictions not found in the text of the law. Worse, it was inspired by a conservative, religious view of what marriages should be. This has caused untold hardships and costs for many Filipinos. It is time we review this doctrine and allow intimate relationships to be what they truly are: a life of celebration, rather than a living hell.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Ponencia, p. 3.
2 Rollo, pp. 27-13. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon (Chair) and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. of the Tenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 60-62. The Decision was penned by Executive Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller of Branch 90, Regional Trial Court, Dasmarifias, Cavite, sitting in Imus, Cavite.
4 Ponencia, p. 4.
5 Id. at 12.
6 Id. at 7.
7 Rollo, p. 61, Regional Trial Court Decision.
8 Ponencia, p. 9.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 12.
11 Rollo, p. 61.
"To support her claim, the petitioner [Mirasol] consulted witll Mme. Shiela Marie O. Montefalcon, the psychologist on case, and based on her psychological evaluation of the parties, it appeared that the respondent is encumbered with a personality deficit classified as narcissistic personality disorder, which is grave, severe and incurable, as well as deeply ingrained in his personality structure that has rendered him as psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and obligations.
. . . .
Largely on the basis of the marital history of the petitioner and the respondent, supported with the findings of the clinical psychologist, the Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently established the root cause of the psychological incapacity[.]" (Emphasis supplied)
12 Ponencia, p. 12.
13 Id. at 9.
14 Id. at 9.
15 Id. at 9.
16 Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/january2015/166357.pdf> 7 [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
17 Id.
18 Ponencia, p. 3.
19 Rollo, p. 61.
20 Ponencia, pp. 2-3.
21 Id. at 1.
22 Id. at 2.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 2.
25 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997) [Per Justice Panganiban, En Banc]:
"The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children."
26 Ponencia , p. 9.
27 FAMILY CODE, art. 36 provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after its celebration.
28 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
29 Id. at 627.
30 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850-852 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
31 Id.
32 Ponencia, p. 9.
33 Rollo, p. 60.
34 Id. at 13, Petition for Review.
35 Id.
36 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 30 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
37 Id. at 36, citing Salita v. Hon. Magtolis, 303 Phil. 106, 113-114 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
38 Id.
39 Aurelio v Aurelio, 665 Phil. 693, 703 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
40 Id.
41 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
42 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
43 Ponencia, p. 6.
44 579 Phil. 187 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division].
45 Ponencia, p. 6.
46 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
47 Id. at 676-679.
48 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
49 Id. at 696.
50 Id. 695-696.
51 Id. at 698-699.
52 Id. at 699.
53 Id.
54 Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/january20151166357.pdf> [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division]. This Court granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration and similarly declaring the parties' marriage as void due to psychological incapacity.
55 Id. at 6-7.
56 Rollo, p. 60.
57 Id. at 61.
58 Id.
59 G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/203284. pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
60 Id. at 7-8.
61 Ponencia, p. 11.
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