Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57804 January 23, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR EMILIANO CARUNCHO JR., ALFONSO CORDOVA, CESAR CORPUZ, JACINTO GONZALES and HON. ERIBERTO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as Judge of the Municipal Court of Pasig, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Rufino B. Javier for respondent E. Caruncho, Jr.

Ricardo S. Luton for respondents Corpuz and Espiritu.

Jose F. Tiburcio for respondents Gonzales and Espiritu.


ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This case is a good example of the saying: "much ado about nothing. And it serves as a reminder of the suggestion that we should relax, take it easy and not get unduly excited. For these reasons, a little whimsy is not out of place.

This case was originally assigned to Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera who was an outstanding student of the Chief Justice. The facts which led to the filing of the case had attracted national attention so it was thought that Justice Melencio-Herrera would once again pen a significant opinion. Due solely to the vagaries of chance, according to the Chief Justice, the lady justice was writing the decisions in leading cases. At one time Justice Antonio P. Barredo remarked that despite his long service with the Court he had not penned a landmark case. But that was before the Federation of Free Farmers case (107 SCRA 352-490 [1981]) which competes with the McDougal and Feliciano tomes in their soporific effects.

Justice Melencio-Herrera in fact already had a ponencia to which nine (9) other justices concurred. But alas, before it could be promulgated some of the brethren changed their minds. No, they did not exactly flip-flop; they merely flipped. Justice Melencio-Herrera has "threatened" to write a separate opinion and hopefully she will tell it all.

It is now my task to write a "decision" which is a misnomer because this opinion will certainly not decide anything. The only function it can serve is that of a resolution to dismiss the petition which will be explained by the Chief Justice later.

In the afternoon of June 16, 1981, which was an election day, Salvador F. Reyes who was a radio reporter for Radio Veritas, addressed certain questions relating the voting procedure to Mayor Emiliano R. Caruncho, Jr. of Pasig, Metro Manila. The good mayor must have had a trying day because instead of answering the questions, he questioned Reyes for questioning him. What happened next could have been settled easily but for the fact that it was televised nationally Mayor Caruncho and some of his companions manhandled Salvador F. Reyes and the incident was on tape. Understandably, there was an outcry against Caruncho, et all. Understandably also, Reyes sought the assistance of the law so that on July 2, 1981, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information in the Municipal Court of Pasig, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35961 and which reads as follows:

"The undersigned City Fiscal of Quezon City pursuant to the authority under Ministry Order No. 109, dated June 22, 1981, accuses Emiliano Caruncho, Jr., Alfonso Cordova, Cesar Corpuz, Jacinto Gonzales and John Doe whose true name and real Identity has not as yet been ascertained, of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.

"That on or about the 16th day of June, 1981, in Pasig, Metro Manna, Philippines, the abovenamed accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of SALVADOR F. REYES, by then and there pulling his hair, strangling him and hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said Salvador F. Reyes physical injuries which have required medical attendance and/or incapacitated him from performing his nine (9) days, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Municipal Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu fixed bail at P200.00 for each accused which was duly posted.

The accused entered pleas of not guilty on July 16, 1981, and on July 23, 1981, they moved to dismiss on the ground that Reyes had executed an affidavit of desistance. In his affidavit Reyes said that the accused had no intention to physically injure, insult, dishonor or discredit him because the incident was "the result of our failure to understand each other."

The motion was opposed by the City Fiscal. He said he had evidence other than the testimony of Reyes and such evidence was sufficient to convict.

Judge Espiritu must have perceived that his action on the motion would attract a lot of attention for he had noted the "wide publicity" given to the incident. And so he carefully composed a 9- page Order which dismissed the case on the ground that:

"... the said affidavit of desistance is in complete consonance with the objective and intention of P.D. 1508 as supplemented by its pertinent letters of instructions and implementations. It leaves therefore, no alternative for this Court except to uphold said affidavit of desistance and to make a finding for all the accused.

The dismissal of the case evoked criticisms from some sectors of the citizenry. Reyes was accused of betraying his profession. It was said that the freedom to gather information had suffered a set-back because of his action.

Enter the Solicitor General in representation of the People of the Philippines. In his petition for certiorari and mandamus, the prayer is for the annulment of the order of dismissal and to order a trial on the merits "without further delay on the ground "that the order of dismissal is void for it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction."

In the light of the foregoing the issue is simple: Did Judge Espiritu commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case against Caruncho, et al. on the basis of the affidavit of desistance. It should be noted that the operative words are "grave abuse of discretion." Accordingly, even if there be an abuse of discretion, if it is not grave and does not inflict substantial harm, the issuance of the prerogative writ of certiorari will not be warranted. On this basis, the petition must fail.

Long before this case was re-assigned to me, Justices Guerrero and de Castro and I had already filed dissenting opinions. Because Justice de Castro's dissent is more comprehensive, he was the logical heir to the case. Unfortunately, however, he was seriously injured in a vehicular accident. It will take sometime before Justice de Castro can work again. In acknowledgment of his contribution, Justice de Castro's opinion is quoted in full as follows:

"I vote to dismiss the petition. I am of the opinion that the order sought to be annulled is perfectly legal.

"As I see it, the petition is anchored on just two (2) grounds: (1) the crime charged is not subject to compromise, and (2) even if it is, the protagonists not being of the same barangay, or barangays in the same city or municipality nor of adjoining barangays, the barangay Lupon cannot assume jurisdiction to effect a compromise under Presidential Decree No. 1508, commonly referred to as the Barangay Court Law.

"In the oral argument, it was made clear that Mayor Caruncho was charged not as a public official but as a private person. The information contains no allegation of respondent Caruncho being a holder of a public office, the very reason why the case was filed in the ordinary court, not in the Sandigan Bayan. The crime as charged against Mayor Caruncho may therefore be the subject of compromise, or amicably settled, under express provision of the aforementioned decree, (Section 2, par. 3, PD No. 1508) as the Solicitor General readily admitted after this matter was clarified.

"The only reason then left to support the petition, as the Solicitor General also had to admit, is that the compromise or amicable settlement upon which the questioned order of the public respondent is based, is of no legal effect because under Presidential Decree No. 1508, only when the parties belong to the same barangay or neighboring barangays may they be brought under the jurisdiction of the Barangay Court for the arbitration proceedings intended to reach an out-of-court settlement of the case. It is precisely because the barangay court cannot acquire jurisdiction that the compromise cannot be effected therein; otherwise there would have been no case filed in the Municipal Court of Pasig.

"The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts.7!ᕼdMᗄ7 This could be accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts which, according to the conceptor of the system the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character. And to make it truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508, and the policy behind it would be better served, if an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties. At least, I find no legal obstacle, expressed or implied, in any existing law to the parties coming to an amicable settlement or compromise of their controversies. As the writer observed during the oral argument, this could even be more "welcome," because the compulsory proceedings also to effect just that kind of settlement, before the barangay court, which could result only in waste of time and expense, would be avoided.

"In civil cases, amicable settlement or some form of voluntary arbitration obviously to ease up case congestion in the courts, by avoiding full-blown judicial proceedings winch usually go all the way from the trial court to the highest appellate court, is encouraged by no less than a specific provision of law. (See Articles 2029 and 2030, New Civil Code.) But amicable settlement of cases, if made to depend on the voluntary will of the parties, is generally hard to come by. Hence, there was felt the need of a compulsory arbitration proceedings as a more effective means of bringing about the desired result, as is precisely the purpose and reason for Presidential Decree No. 1508. Advisely, because of the compulsory nature of the proceedings thereunder, certain stations have to be imposed not to subject the parties to undue expenses and inconvenience. Thus the territorial jurisdiction of the barangay courts is primarily based on the residence of the parties. The creation of these courts, however, could not have been intended to prevent voluntary settlement of cases being entered into without regard to the residence of the would be litigants, which obviously, and in reality, is the more desirable mode of achieving the main objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 — that of declogging court dockets. This is so because in a compulsory arbitration, there is no sure guaranty of the case not reaching the regular courts. On the other hand, where the amicable settlement is voluntary, the case would certainly no longer entail any court action, or, at least, a long-drawn one.

"In the instant case, the affidavit of desistance of the complainant, Salvador Reyes, was made the basis of a motion to dismiss. This is not legally infeasible since the offense is admittedly subject to compromise under the law (PD No. 1508). Why should the parties undergo the compulsory arbitration proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 1508 where, acting on their own volition, they are willing to do exactly what the barangay court would wish or order them to do? Under the theory of the petitioner, this is precisely what would be unjustifiably required to be done. On ground of logic alone, it is hard to perceive any reason why it should be so.

"Even following petitioner's theory, the petition should be dismissed it appearing that both the offended party and the offender are now residents of the same barangay as manifested to this Court (p. 8, Majority Opinion). If this is so, a mere reiteration of the affidavit of desistance would result in the dismissal of the cage since the objection of the Solicitor General to giving effect to said affidavit has already been removed. It would, therefore, serve the cause of a speedy administration of justice to dismiss the instant petition, so as to allow the dismissal of the case against respondents-accused to stand.

"It is also contended by respondents that certiorari is not the proper remedy, citing the case of People vs. City Judge Villanueva G.R. No. 56443, December 19, 1981. A suppossedly crucial distinction is, however, drawn in the majority opinion, between the case cited and the instant case in that in the former, the period of appeal had lapsed before the certiorari petition was filed, while the instant Petition was filed well within the period of appeal. The distinction pointed out is to me of no consequence, as not to constitute a hindrance to the application of the ruling of the Villanueva case. This is so because if the period of appeal has not yet lapsed when the instant Petition was filed, the impropriety of certiorari would even be more pronounced, for it then cannot be said that 'there is no appeal' which is an indispensable requirement for certiorari to be properly resorted to. I neither cannot agree that there was such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to justify certiorari despite the availability of an appeal as the proper remedy, the error if any, being actually one of judgment, not of jurisdiction. As demonstrated above, there was in fact no error at all.

Justice Guerrero's opinion reads:

"I beg to dissent from the majority opinion because I believe that the public policy enunciated by the decree in allowing amicable settlement in cases of fight offenses in order to promote the speedy administration of justice, preserve and develop Filipino culture in accordance with the constitutional mandate, strengthen the family as a basic social institution and thereby help relieve the courts of docket congestion and enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, should be the overriding consideration in resolving the petition at bar. I submit that this should be the functional attitude that the courts should take and consider the social justification of the decree. not through the purely legalistic, traditional and analytical solution of the problem at hand.

"While it is conceded that the State has the sovereign right to prosecute criminal offenses and that the fiscal has the full control in public prosecution, P.D. No. 1508 itself stays the prosecuting arm of the government in cases of light offenses and allows the parties to settle their differences in the larger and greater interest of public peace and order. The objection that the settlement in the instant case is not effective because the parties reside in different barangays has, to my mind, been successfully overcome by the certification of the barangay captain that the complainant Reyes and respondent Caruncho NOW reside in the same street and within the same barangay in Pasig at MRR Road, Barangay No. 6, Pasig, Metro Manila since July 1981.

"I do not agree that the principle of estoppel should be raised against such certification in order to thwart the utilitarian value of the decree. The parties themselves desire peace. The State is dutybound to preserve and maintain peace. The Judiciary should do no less.

I share the views expressed by Justices de Castro and Guerrero above-quoted. Additionally, I must say that even if the light felony involving Caruncho, et al. is not covered by P.D. No. 1508, Judge Espiritu did not commit a grave abuse of discretion for. True it is that in criminal cases society is the ultimate aggrieved party for which reason the People of the Philippines is designated as the plaintiff. True it is also that except as provided in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code a pardon by the private offended party does not extinguish criminal liability. And true it is further that the dropping of criminal cases by the execution of affidavits of desistance by complainants is not looked with favor. These are Hornbook doctrines. But what is actually done in our criminal justice system? First, there is plea bargaining between the prosecution and the defense. For instance, murder is charged but in exchange for a plea of guilty the charge is reduced to homicide and the accused is allowed to claim a number of mitigating circumstances. It is not uncommon for estafa, libel physical injuries and even homicide cases to be dismissed because the complainant has lost interest or alleged that the complaint was filed as a result of a misunderstanding. A number of examples can be given and they can fill a book.

In the instant case, Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu has presented an affidavit of desistance. In the light of contemporary practice the question which is raised in this petition for certiorari is whether or not he acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. I submit that there was no grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the petition should be dismissed.

As a footnote, it should be mentioned that Salvador F. Reyes transferred his residence from Fairview Park in Quezon City to Barangay Caniogan in Pasig where Caruncho also lives. On March 22, 1982, the two executed a verified amicable settlement before Barangay Captain Ruperto Concepcion. Commenting on this factual development the Solicitor General says: "The present case, we submit, falls within the spirit and purposes of P.D. 1508, particularly to promote the speedy administration of justice without judicial recourse and, thus, help relieve the courts of docket congestion (WHEREASES of the decree)." To be sure this applies only to Mayor Caruncho but not to the other private respondents. After I had written the foregoing, some "developments" took place and I feel that I must make the following statements but as mine alone only.

Justice de Castro has returned from his extended sick leave. Since his dissenting opinion was more extensive than mine, I asked him if he wanted to write the "main" opinion but he demurred. Instead he signified his concurrence to my opinion.ℒαwρhi৷

Justice Melencio-Herrera's separate opinion which is actually a second revision of her first separate opinion bewails the length of time it has taken to dispose of the case. She appears to attribute the blame mostly on the Chief Justice, a posture which I do not share. A reading of the third version of her separate opinion will readily reveal some of the causes for the delay which I believe cannot be blamed on the Chief Justice:

Because some of the justices "flipped" it was necessary to re-agenda the case a number of times for further discussion. The Court after all is a deliberative body where opinions can and do change after debates which can sometimes be heated. Moreover, in between the different dates when the case was placed on the agenda the composition of the Court was changing. Justices Barredo and Vasquez, retired; Justice de Castro went on prolonged sick leave after his accident; Justices Teehankee and Gutierrez, Jr. went to Cairo to attend a conference and even Justice Melencio-Herrera went abroad.

At any rate, I fail to see any compelling reason for deliberate haste in the disposition of the case. There would be reason enough to urge expeditious action on the petition if the Court had been consistently disposed to grant it but, alas, that is not so. The final action is to dismiss the petition.

WHEREFORE, for lack of necessary votes to grant the petition the same is hereby dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Guerrero, Makasiar and Aquino, JJ., concur.


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