EN BANC

G.R. No. 147589               June 25, 2003

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its Secretary-General, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 147613               June 25, 2003

BAYAN MUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Before the Court are Motions for proclamation filed by various party-list participants. The ultimate question raised is this: Aside from those already validly proclaimed1 pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners? The answer to this question is circumscribed by the eight-point guideline given in our June 26, 2001 Decision in these consolidated cases, as well as by the four unique parameters of the Philippine party-list system:

"First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.

"Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are ‘qualified’ to have a seat in the House of Representatives.

"Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one ‘qualifying’ and two additional seats.

"Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed ‘in proportion to their total number of votes."2

The Antecedents

To fully understand the matter on hand, we deem it wise to recapitulate some relevant antecedents.

On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated in these consolidated cases its Decision requiring Comelec to do the following:

"x x x [I]mmediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further directed to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.

"The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec ‘to refrain from proclaiming any winner’ during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition."3

Comelec’s First Partial

Compliance Report

In its First Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, Comelec recommended that the following party-list participants be deemed to have hurdled the eight-point guideline referred to in the aforementioned Court Decision:

1. BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA)

2. AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!)

3. LUZON FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL)

4. ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN)

5. ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA (ABA)

6. PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM)

7. SANLAKAS

It also recommended the disqualification of the following party-list participants for their failure to pass the guidelines:

  • MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA (MAD)

  • ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC)

  • VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP)

  • ABAG PROMDI (PROMDI)

  • NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION (NPC)

  • LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS)

  • CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC)

  • LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP)

  • BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG (BUHAY)

  • COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED)

  • COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO)

  • NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION (NCIA)

  • ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG INDUSTRIYA NG AKLAT, INC. (AKLAT)

  • THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST (FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND PEOPLE) ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (MARCOS LOYALIST)

  • CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CREBA)

  • BIGKIS PINOY FOUNDATION (BIGKIS)

  • AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO (AKSYON)

In response to this Report, the Court issued its August 14, 2001 Resolution which partially lifted its May 9, 2001 Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The Court did so to enable Comelec to proclaim Bayan Muna as the first "winner in the last party-list election, with the caveat that all proclamations should be made in accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in the instant case but also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000, on how to determine and compute the winning parties and nominees in the party-list elections."

In another Resolution dated August 24, 2001, the Court again partially lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the Comelec to proclaim Akbayan and Butil "as winning party-list groups, in accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in the instant case but also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000."

In its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Comelec, recommended that -- "except for the modification that the APEC, BUHAY, COCOFED and CIBAC be declared as having complied with the guidelines set forth in the June 26, 2001 Decision in the instant cases [--] the Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001 be affirmed."4 But because of (1) the conflicting Comelec reports regarding the qualifications of APEC and CIBAC and (2) the disparity in the percentage of votes obtained by AMIN, the Court in a Resolution dated November 13, 2001, required the parties to file within 20 days from notice their respective final position papers on why APEC, CIBAC, and/or AMIN should or should not be proclaimed winners in the last party-list elections.

Thereafter, in another Resolution dated January 29, 2002,5 the Court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by Comelec in its First Compliance Report.

Thus, in the same Resolution, the Court once more lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the Comelec to proclaim APEC and CIBAC as winners in the party-list elections. The Court said:

"we accept Comelec’s submission, per the OSG, that APEC and CIBAC have sufficiently met the 8-point guidelines of this Court and have garnered sufficient votes to entitle them to seats in Congress. Since these issues are factual in character, we are inclined to adopt the Commission’s findings, absent any patent arbitrariness or abuse or negligence in its action. There is no substantial proof that CIBAC is merely an arm of JIL, or that APEC is an extension of PHILRECA. The OSG explained that these are separate entities with separate memberships. Although APEC’s nominees are all professionals, its membership is composed not only of professionals but also of peasants, elderly, youth and women. Equally important, APEC addresses the issues of job creation, poverty alleviation and lack of electricity. Likewise, CIBAC is composed of the underrepresented and marginalized and is concerned with their welfare. CIBAC is particularly interested in the youth and professional sectors."6

To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approved the First Partial Compliance Report and its amendments, the following nominees were validly proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L. Maza), AKBAYAN (Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC (Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva).

Comelec’s Second Partial
Compliance Report

In its Second Compliance Report dated August 22, 2001 and received by this Court on August 28, 2001, Comelec recommended that the following party-list participants7 be deemed qualified under the Court’s guidelines:

10. ABANSE! PINAY

11. ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, AT HANAPBUHAY (AKO)

12. ALAGAD

13. SENIOR CITIZENS/ELDERY SECTORAL PARTY (ELDERLY)

14. ALL TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (ATUCP)

15. MARITIME PARTY (MARITIME)

16. ANG BAGONG BAYANI – OFW LABOR PARTY (OFW)

17. ANIBAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGINGISDA, AT MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULTURA – KATIPUNAN (AMMMA)

18. ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN)

19. ALYANSA NG MGA MAY KAPANSANAN SA PILIPINAS (AKAP)

20. MINDANAO FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS’ ORGANIZATION, INC. (MSCFO)

21. WOMENPOWER, INC. (WPI)

22. AGGRUPATION AND ALLIANCE OF FARMERS AND FISHERFOLKS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AAAFPI)

23. ALL WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS (AWATU)

In the same Compliance Report, the poll body classified the following party-list groups as unqualified:

  • GREEN PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION (GREEN PHIL)

  • PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP)

  • ANG LAKAS NG BAGONG KOOPERATIBA (ALAB)

  • PARTIDO NG MARALITANG PILIPINO – PINATUBO PARTY (PMP-PINATUBO)

  • REBOLUSYONARYONG ALYANSANG MAKABANSA (RAM)

  • BAYAN NG NAGTATAGUYOD NG DEMOKRATIKONG IDEOLOGIYA AT LAYUNIN, INC. (BANDILA)

  • BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION (BAGONG BAYANI)

  • KABATAAN NG MASANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL)

  • AARANGKADA ANG MGA HANDA ORAS-ORAS (AHOY)

  • PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (PMA)

  • ALLIANCE TO ALLEVIATE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER, INC. (AASENSO KA)

  • PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO SOSYALISTA NG PILIPINAS (PDSP)

  • COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CUP)

  • ATIN (FORMERLY ABANTE BISAYA)

  • VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC)

  • ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS CONSULTANTS AND DESIGNERS, INC. (ABCD)

  • LIBERAL PARTY (LP)

  • CITIZEN’S DRUGWATCH FOUNDATION, INC. (DRUGWATCH)

  • ALAY SA BAYAN PARA SA KALAYAAN AT DEMOKRASYA (ABAKADA)

  • ASOSASYON NG MGA TAGA INSURANCE SA PILIPINAS, INC. (ATIP)

  • ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW)

  • NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR PLANTERS (NFSP)

  • KABALIKAT NG BAYAN PARTY (KABALIKAT)

  • PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN)

  • BANTAY BAYAN FOUNDATION PARTY, INC. (BANTAY-BAYAN)

  • ABANTE KILUSANG KOOPERATIBA SA GITNANG LUZON [AKK COALITION]

  • GREEN PHILIPPINES (GREEN)

  • PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATORS (PADPAO)

  • ALLIANCE FOR GREATER ACHIEVEMENTS IN PEACE AND PROSPERITY (AGAP)

  • ALYANSA NG KOOPERATIBANG PANGKABUHAYAN PARTY (ANGKOP)

  • NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (NAD)

  • PEOPLE POWER PARTY (PEOPLE POWER)

  • PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGICAL COUNCIL (PTC)

  • PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, INC. (PLAM)

  • PROFESSIONAL CRIMINOLOGIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PCAP)

  • CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT, AND PEACE (JEEP)

Comelec’s Final Partial
Compliance Report

In its Final Partial Compliance Report dated September 27, 2001 and received by the Court a day later, Comelec recommended that the following be considered as qualified party-list participants:

24. NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TRICYCLE OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACTODAP)

25. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATION, INC. (SCFO)

26. TRIBAL COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TRICAP)

27. PILIPINONG MAY KAPANSANAN (PINOY MAY K)

28. VETERANS CARE AND WELFARE ORGANIZATION (VETERANS CARE)

29. UNION OF THE FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC. (OCW-UNIFIL)

30. DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (DA)

31. PILIPINO WORKERS PARTY (PWP)

32. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS (PARP)

33. ALLIANCE OF RETIRED POSTAL EMPLOYEES AND SENIOR CITIZENS, INC. (ARPES)

34. AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. (ARBA)

35. FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FEJODAP)

36. GABAY NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO PARTY (GABAY-OFW)

37. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES OF SETTLERS (AASAHAN)

38. ALLIANCE FOR YOUTH SOLIDARITY (AYOS)

39. PARTY FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS AND EMPOWERMENT AND RE-INTEGRATION (POWER)

40. KILOS KABATAAN PILIPINO (KILOS)

41. KALOOB-KA ISANG LOOB PARA SA MARANGAL NA PANINIRAHAN (KALOOB)

42. ALYANSA NG MGA MAMAMAYAN AT MANDARAGAT SA LAWA NG LAGUNA, INC. (ALYANSA)

43. DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (DFP)

44. PARTIDO KATUTUBONG PILIPINO (KATUTUBO)

Further, the Comelec recommended the disqualification of the following party-list groups:

  • AALAGAHAN ANG ATING KALIKASAN (ALAS)

  • PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERS (PSAE)

  • PARTIDO PARA SA DEMOKRATIKONG REPORMA (PDR)

  • CONSUMERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CONSUMERS)

  • CONFEDERATION OF NON-STOCK SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. (CONSLA)

  • PEOPLE’S PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND GOOD GOVERNMENT TOWARDS ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT (PAG-ASA)

  • AHONBAYAN, INC. (AHONBAYAN)

  • ANGAT

  • SAMA-SAMA KAYA NATIN ‘TO FOUNDATION, INC. (KASAMA)

  • A PEACEFUL ORGANIZATION LEADERSHIP, FRIENDSHIP, SERVICE MOVEMENT (APO)

  • PHILIPPINE DENTAL ASSOCIATION (PDA)

  • PUSYON (BISAYA) PILIPINO (PUSYON)

  • SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)

  • CITIZEN’S ANTI-CRIME ASSISTANCE GROUP, INC. (CAAG)

  • ASA AT SAMAHAN NG KARANIWANG PILIPINO (ASAKAPIL)

  • BUSINESSMEN AND ENTREPRENEURS ASSOCIATION, INC. (BEA)

  • UNITED ARCHITECTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (UAP)

  • ABAY PAMILYA FOUNDATION, INC. (ABAY PAMILYA)

  • PEOPLE’S REFORM PARTY (PRP)

  • COALITION FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND WELFARE (COALITION 349)

  • RIZALIST PARTY (RP)

  • NATIONAL URBAN POOR ASSEMBLY (NUPA)

  • ALLIANCE FOR MERITOCRACY (AFM)

  • BALIKATAN SA KABUHAYAN BUHAY COALITION (BSK)

  • BANTAY DAGAT, INC. (BDI)

  • CONFEDERATION OF HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION FOR REFORMS IN GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENT, INC. (HOMEOWNERS)

  • PORT USERS CONFEDERATION, INC. (PUC)

  • LABAN PARA SA KAPAYAPAAN, KATARUNGAN, AT KAUNLARAN (KKK)

  • BONDING IDEALISM FOR NATIONAL HUMAN INITIATIVE (BINHI)

  • KATIPUNAN NG MGA BANTAY BAYAN SA PILIPINAS (KABAYAN)

  • FEDERATION OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF PHIL. VETERANS, INC. (LAHING VETERANO)

  • PRIME MOVERS FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS (PRIMO)

  • PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE OF CITIZENS FOR DEMOCRACY (PACD)

  • COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS (CAP)

  • TAPAT FOUNDATION, INC. (TAPAT)

  • ALLIANCE FOR ALLEVIATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND TRUST PARTY (AKA)

  • ANG IPAGLABAN MO FOUNDATION (AIM)

  • PHILIPPINE MINE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT (PMSEA)

  • BICOL SARO PARTY (BSP)

  • AABANTE KA PILIPINAS PARTY (SAGIP BAYAN MOVEMENT) (APIL)

  • PHILIPPINE PEOPLE’S PARLIAMENT (PPP-YOUTH)

  • SPORTS AND HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (SHAF)

  • KILUSAN TUNGO SA PAMBANSANG TANGKILIKAN, INC. (KATAPAT)

  • CITIZENS’ FOUNDATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES AND INJUSTICES, INC. (CITIZEN)

  • NACIONALISTA PARTY (NP) (Withdrew participation in the party-list election)

  • SANDIGANG MARALITA (SM)

  • ONEWAY PRINTING TECHNICAL FOUNDATION, INC. (ONEWAY PRINT)

  • PHILIPPINE JURY MOVEMENT (JURY)

  • ALTERNATIVE ACTION (AA)

  • DEMOCRATIC WORKERS’ PARTY (DWP)

  • SECURITY UNITED LEAGUE NATIONWIDE GUARDS, INC. (SULONG)

  • ORGANISASYONG KAUGNAYAN NASYONAL SA PAG-UNLAD (O.K. NAPU)

  • PAMBANSANG SANGGUNIANG KATIPUNAN NG BARANGAY KAGAWAD SA PILIPINAS (KATIPUNAN)

  • NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (NCCO)

  • NATIONWIDE ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMERS, INC. (NACI)

  • LUZVIMINDA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (LEDFI)

  • TINDOG PARA HAN KABUBUWASON HAN WARAYNON (TINDOG WARAY)

  • FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (FLRF)

  • KATRIBU MINDANAO, INC. (KATRIBU)

  • DEMOKRATIKONG UGNAYAN TAPAT SA SAMBAYANAN (DUGTUNGAN)

  • KATARUNGAN SA BAYAN TAGAPAGTANGGOL NG SAMBAYANAN (KABATAS)

  • GO! GO! PHILIPPINES MOVEMENT

  • PAMBANSANG SAMAHANG LINGKOD NG BAYAN, INC. (PASALBA)

  • PHILIPPINE REFORMIST SOCIETY (PRS)

  • GABAYBAYAN (GAD)

  • ALUHAY NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. (ALUHAI)

  • ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT TO ENHANCE THE NATIONAL AGENDA (OSMEÑA)

All these Compliance Reports have already been affirmed by this Court except that, in regard to the First Compliance Report, it agreed -- as earlier stated -- to add APEC and CIBAC to the list of qualified groups.

Other Significant
Orders and Pleadings

Under its Resolution No. NBC-02-001,8 Comelec motu proprio amended its Compliance Reports by, inter alia, adding four more party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections.

In its Comment dated November 15, 2002, the OSG opined that "Comelec acted correctly in revising its Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, so as to reflect the correct number of votes cast in favor of qualified party-list parties and organizations."9 Consequently, it moved to lift our TRO with respect to COCOFED, BUHAY, SANLAKAS and PM, because "[a]s shown in the revised COMELEC Party-list Canvass Report No. 26, movants BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM received 4.25%, 3.35%, 2.21% and 3.17%, respectively, of the total votes cast10 in the May 14, 2001 party-list election."11

It added that "the proclamation by the COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM (as well as all other qualified parties and organizations which received at least 2% of the total votes cast in the same party-list election) as winners in the said party-list is in order."12

However, in its November 25, 2002 Comment, the OSG contended that NCIA, "which is not a qualified party or organization per the Comelec [First] Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, cannot be proclaimed as winner in the last party-list elections."13 It also recommended that ABA’s Motion to lift the TRO with respect to its proclamation should be likewise granted, because it is a "qualified party or organization that hurdled the 2% threshold in the last party-list elections. For, ABA received 3.54% of the votes cast in the said party-list elections, as shown in COMELEC Resolution No. NBC-02-001. ABA’s proclamation as winner is therefore in order."14

Preparatory to resolving the present Motions and in observance of due process, the Court resolved on February 18, 2003 to require the parties, including the OSG, to submit their respective Position Papers on the following issues:

1) Whether Labo v. Comelec,15 Grego v. Comelec16 and related cases should be deemed applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections

2) Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently disqualified for having failed to meet the eight-point guideline contained in our June 26, 2001 Decision should be deducted from the "total votes cast for the party-list system" during the said elections

The Court’s Ruling

At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon the claims of the OSG that the initial recommendation contained in Comelec’s First Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, regarding BUHAY and COCOFED should be reconsidered, and that these two party-list groups should be deemed qualified.

Qualification of
BUHAY and COCOFED

In recommending the disqualification of BUHAY for being "most probably merely an extension of the El Shaddai," a religious group, Comelec said in the above-mentioned Report:

"Upon hearing the case for BUHAY, the Commission determined that, based upon BUHAY’s declarations of intent in its constitution, upon its avowed platform of government – which both mirror the sentiments of the El Shaddai Movement – and upon the circumstances surrounding its relationship with the El Shaddai Movement, BUHAY is most probably merely an extension of the El Shaddai. In this light, it is very likely that the relationship between the leader of the El Shaddai, and the nominee of BUHAY is less a matter of serendipity than an attempt to circumvent the statutory prohibition against sects or denominations from participating in the party-list elections."17

In the same Report, Comelec also stated that COCOFED did not deserve a seat in the House of Representatives, because it was allegedly an "adjunct of the government." Explained the Commission:

"COCOFED is a sectoral party representing the peasantry. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization of coconut farmers and producers, established in 1947. It has no religious affiliations. However, the records indicate that it is an adjunct of the government.

"COCOFED’s Amended By-Laws specifically provides that:

‘The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority or his duly authorized representative shall automatically be a member of the National Board.’

The Philippine Coconut Authority is an administrative agency of the government which receives support and funding from the national government. Thus, to have the Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority sit on the National Board of COCOFED clearly amounts to ‘participation of the government in the affairs of candidate’ which, as this Court has said, would be ‘unfair to the other parties,’ and ‘deleterious to the objectives of the law.’

"Furthermore, in the Articles of Incorporation of COCOFED, it declared, as one of its primary purposes, the obtaining of ‘possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources.’"18

On the other hand, in its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the OSG -- in representation of the poll agency -- argued that the above findings of the Comelec in regard, inter alia, to BUHAY and COCOFED are "not supported by substantial evidence" and, thus, "should be modified accordingly." This opinion is buttressed by the OSG’s Comment dated November 15, 2002.19

The OSG stressed that the Comelec report on BUHAY was "merely anchored on conjectures or speculations." On COCOFED, the OSG explained that the bylaws making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of the COCOFED National Board "has already been deleted as early as May, 1988."

It added that while the primary purposes of COCOFED’s Articles of Incorporation authorize the organization "to help explore and obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources x x x," this statement does not "by itself constitute such substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assisted by the government."

We are convinced. For the same reasons that we concurred in the earlier accreditation of APEC and CIBAC, we accept the OSG’s position that indeed Comelec erred in disqualifying BUHAY and COCOFED.20

Therefore, we now add these two groups to the list of 44 qualified groups earlier mentioned and thereby increase the total to 46.

We shall now take up the main question of which parties/organizations won during the last party-list election.

Legal Effect of the Disqualifications on the "Total Votes Cast"

The instant Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of many party-list organizations has reduced the "total number of votes cast for the party-list elections." Because of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark required by law has now been allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now pray for their proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections.

Recall that under Section 11(b)21 of RA 7941 (the Party-List Act), only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system are entitled to have a seat in the House of Representatives. The critical question now is this: To determine the "total votes cast for the party-list system," should the votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be deducted? Otherwise stated, does the clause "total votes cast for the party-list system" include only those ballots cast for qualified party-list candidates?

To answer this question, there is a need to review related jurisprudence on the matter, especially Labo v. Comelec22 and Grego v. Comelec,23 which were mentioned in our February 18, 2003 Resolution.

Labo and Grego Not Applicable

In Labo, the Court declared that "the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."24 In other words, the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified candidate cannot be considered "stray."

However, "this rule would be different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."25 In short, the votes cast for a "notoriously disqualified" candidate may be considered "stray" and excluded from the canvass.

The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated in Grego, which held that the exception mentioned in Labo v. Comelec "is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate."26

Note, however, that the foregoing pronouncements (1) referred to regular elections for local offices and (2) involved the interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6646.27 They were not meant to cover party-list elections, which are specifically governed by RA 7941. Section 10 of this latter law clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a coalition "not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted":

"SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. – Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first vote is a vote for candidate for membership of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organization, or coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998." (Emphasis supplied)

The language of the law is clear; hence, there is room, not for interpretation, but merely for application.28 Likewise, no recourse to extrinsic aids is warranted when the language of the law is plain and unambiguous.29

Another reason for not applying Labo and Grego is that these cases involve single elective posts, while the present controversy pertains to the acquisition of a number of congressional seats depending on the total election results -- such that even those garnering second, third, fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed winners depending on their compliance with other requirements.

RA 7941 is a special statute governing the elections of party-list representatives and is the controlling law in matters pertaining thereto. Since Labo and Section 6 of RA 6646 came into being prior to the enactment of RA 7941, the latter is a qualification of the former ruling and law. On the other hand, Grego and other related cases that came after the enactment of RA 7941 should be construed as inapplicable to the latter.30

Subtracting the votes garnered by these disqualified party-list groups from the total votes cast under the party-list system will reduce the base figure to 6,523,185. This means that the two-percent threshold can be more easily attained by the qualified marginalized and under-represented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of disqualified party-list participants will increase and broaden the number of representatives from these sectors. Doing so will further concretize and give flesh to the policy declaration in RA 7941, which we reproduce thus:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered, national and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

Need for Patience and Perseverance

BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list candidates disqualified after the holding of the party-list elections will result in the instability of the system. The reason is that qualified party-list candidates would be encouraged to seek the disqualification of the other candidates for the sole purpose of attaining the needed percentage of the votes cast. Although such scenario may be possible, we believe that the perceived "instability" can be alleviated because, (1) unlike in the past elections, Comelec now has the herein qualified and disqualified participants’ list, which can be used for future elections; and (2) in the light of recent jurisprudential developments, Comelec will now be guided accordingly when accrediting new candidates for the next party-list elections and will be able to set the period for accreditation in such time and manner as to enable it to determine their qualifications long before the elections are held.

Indeed, it takes patience and perseverance to have the marginalized and under-represented sectors ably represented in Congress. The controversies churned during the 1998 and the 2001 party-list elections should further embolden, not distract, the nation in the process of implementing a genuine and sound Philippine-style party-list system. At this point, the Court needs to stress what it said in Veterans:

"[T]he dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State’s lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.

"With adequate information and dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style."31

We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for computing the number of nominees that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned agencies of government, especially the Commission on Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list candidates conform to the principle of proportional representation mandated by the law.

The Party-List Winners

As discussed earlier, the votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the present cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide.

Accordingly, we will now tally and rank the qualified party-list participants during the last elections, pursuant to the approved Comelec Compliance Reports32 and our various Resolutions in these consolidated cases. Based on our foregoing discussion, we will deduct the votes obtained by the 11633 disqualified candidates from the total votes cast for the May 14, 2001 elections. The votes for these disqualified groups total 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the total votes cast as reported in the Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of 6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. This new figure representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will now be the basis for computing the two-percent threshold for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.

To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. Be it remembered that the Commission recommended for qualification only 42 party-list candidates in its three Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants we approved in our January 29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY and COCOFED) per our earlier discussion in this ruling. Table No. 1 below-lists the 46 qualified parties.

Table No. 134

Rank Party-List
Group
Votes Cast Percentage
to Total Votes
Cast (%)
1 BAYAN MUNA 1,708,253 26.19
2 APEC 802,060 12.29
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86
8 ABA 242,199 3.71
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51
10 PM 216,823 3.32
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07
13 AKO 126,012 1.93
14 ALAGAD 117,161 1.80
15 ELDERLY 106,496 1.63
16 ATUCP 103,273 1.58
17 MARITIME 98,946 1.52
18 OFW 97,085 1.49
19 AMMMA 65,735 1.01
20 ANAKBAYAN 63,312 0.97
21 AKAP 54,925 0.84
22 MSCFO 49,914 0.76
23 WPI 46,831 0.72
24 AAAFPI 43,882 0.67
25 AWATU 42,149 0.65
26 NACTODAP 38,898 0.60
27 SCFO 37,470 0.57
28 TRICAP 35,807 0.55
29 PINOY MAY K 32,151 0.49
30 VETERANS CARE 31,694 0.49
31 OCW-UNIFIL 29,400 0.45
32 PWP 24,182 0.37
33 DA 24,029 0.37
34 PARP 23,297 0.36
35 ARPES 22,497 0.34
36 ARBA 22,345 0.34
37 FEJODAP 21,335 0.33
38 GABAY OFW 17,777 0.27
39 AASAHAN 16,787 0.26
40 AYOS 15,871 0.24
41 POWER 13,050 0.20
42 KILOS 11,170 0.17
43 KALOOB 9,137 0.14
44 ALYANSA 7,882 0.12
45 KATUTUBO 6,602 0.10
46 DFP 6,600 0.10
Total 6,523,185

The Winners and
Their Nominees

Using simple mathematics, we find that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least two percent of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast. Two percent of this number is 130,464. Hence, only those qualified parties that obtained at least 130,464 votes may be declared winners. On this basis, the winners are as follows:

Table No. 2

Rank Party-List
Group
Votes Cast Percentage
to Total Votes
Cast (%)
1 BAYAN MUNA 1,708,253 26.19
2 APEC 802,060 12.29
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86
8 ABA 242,199 3.71
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51
10 PM 216,823 3.32
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07

We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in accordance with the formula in Veterans. For purposes of determining the number of its nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that obtained the highest number of votes) is considered the first party. The applicable formula35 is as follows:

Number of votes of first party
Total votes for party-list system
= Proportion of votes of first party relative to
total votes for party-list system

Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent:

1,708,253
6,523,185
= 26.19%

Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to three (3) seats.1âwphi1 This finding is pursuant to our ruling in Veterans, the pertinent portions of which we reproduce as follows:

"If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat."

x x x           x x x          x x x

"Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party." 36

As adverted to earlier, the issue of whether additional seats should be allocated to APEC, AKBAYAN, BUTIL and CIBAC will not be addressed in this Resolution; a separate Motion (with Supplemental Motion) challenging their entitlement thereto has been filed by BAYAN MUNA and is still pending completion as of this writing. Hence, we shall compute only the additional seat or seats to be allocated, if any, to the other qualified parties – BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY.

Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:

Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party
Votes Cast for First Party
x Allotted Seats for First Party
= 290,760
1,708,253
x 3
= 0.51

Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.37 It is entitled to only one qualifying seat like all the other qualified parties that are ranked below it, as shown in Table No. 3:

Table No. 3

Rank Party-List Votes Percentage(%) Additional
Seats
38
2 APEC 802,060 12.29 n/c
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79 n/c
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06 n/c
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96 n/c
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46 0.51
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86 0.44
8 ABA 242,199 3.71 0.42
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51 0.40
10 PM 216,823 3.32 0.38
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31 0.26
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07 0.24

In sum, the above-named party-list winners, excluding those with a separate pending challenge, are entitled to the following congressional seats:

1. BAYAN MUNA – three (3) seats [one qualifying and two additional seats]

2. BUHAY – one qualifying seat only

3. AMIN – one qualifying seat only

4. ABA – one qualifying seat only

5. COCOFED – one qualifying seat only

6. PM – one qualifying seat only

7. SANLAKAS – one qualifying seat only

8. ABANSE! PINAY – one qualifying seat only

Epilogue

The determination of the winners in the last party-list elections has been neither easy nor simple. The novelty of the party-list system in our country necessarily demanded careful study and deliberation by the Court. Principles and precedents in other democracies of the world have not been very helpful, because our party-list law (RA 7941) has earmarked unique parameters, giving rise to an equally distinctive Philippine-style party-list system. Our difficulties have also been aggravated by the less than firm actions of the Commission on Elections referred to earlier, which had to be reversed based on the OSG’s later submissions.

To help all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections, speed up the process of determining the party-list winners in the future, we deem it wise to summarize the implementing process we followed in this Resolution, as follows:

1. After the promulgation of our Decision on June 26, 2001, we directed Comelec to conduct a factual determination as to which of the various party-list candidates had passed the eight-point guideline we instituted in that Decision. Although we gave Comelec only 30 days to undertake the work, it was able to submit its Final Compliance Report only on September 27, 2001.

2. Of the various parties and organizations39 which Comelec allowed to participate in the 2001 party-list elections, it recommended -- in its three Compliance Reports to the Court -- 42 to be qualified. Later on, four more groups were added, for a total of 46.

3. Next, we determined which of the 46 qualified parties garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. To do so, we subtracted the votes obtained by the disqualified candidates from the "total votes cast." Those parties, organizations and coalitions that had obtained at least two percent of this balance were declared winners.

4. After identifying the winners, we determined, by using the formulas mandated in Veterans v. Comelec, how many nominees each winning party was entitled to.

5. The foregoing process would have been finished long ago and the winners proclaimed before the end of the year 2002, had Comelec been more resolute and exacting in the factual determinations contained in its Compliance Reports.

6. In the interest of due process, the Court required Position Papers on the issue of whether the votes of disqualified candidates should be deducted from the "total votes cast" nationwide.

7. The two rollos of these two consolidated cases contain about 14,000 pages, because almost all of the original party-list participants filed -- some repeatedly -- motions, pleas, position papers and so on, which all needed attention. Thus, the Court had to devote an enormous amount of time and effort poring over, understanding, and ruling upon these submissions.

8. In the interest of speedy justice, this matter was deliberated upon; and this Resolution was discussed, finalized and promulgated by the Court within weeks after it had received the last Position Paper mentioned in item 6 above.

IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the winners can truly be made much more expeditiously, now that there are precedents to guide all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections. For one thing, Comelec already has the herein base list of 46 qualified parties. For another, given the lessons and experiences in these proceedings, it can now more speedily, more carefully and more prudently pass upon the qualifications of new candidates. Such process can even be done in advance under such rules and regulations it may issue, consistent with the law and with our Decisions and Resolutions here and in Veterans, to pre-qualify participants well in advance of the elections.

In closing, the Court hopes that, with each bit of wisdom they learned and after the arduous journey they experienced in our one-of-a-kind Philippine-style party-list system, the marginalized and under-represented sectors of our country will be accorded ever-widening opportunities to participate in nation-building, so that they can help develop -- in peace and harmony -- a society that is just, humane, progressive and free.

WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes cast in the last party-list elections, the following qualified participants are DECLARED elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections to proclaim -- upon finality of this Resolution -- these winners and their respective nominees, we hereby partially LIFT our Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001, in regard to them only. It is made permanent in regard to the rest that did not qualify and win.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., with due respect, I reiterate my dissenting opinion, promulgated along with the ponencia, on 26 June 2001 (359 SCRA 698, 733-741).
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.


Footnotes

1 These are BAYAN MUNA with three nominees; and AKBAYAN, BUTIL, APEC and CIBAC with one nominee each.

2 Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, 342 SCRA 244, 255, October 6, 2000, per Panganiban, J.

3 Pp. 42-43; rollo, GR No. 147613, Vol. I, pp. 377-378.

4 P. 26; rollo, GR No. 147589, Vol. III, p. 2889. In a Manifestation dated December 5, 2001, the OSG reiterated its position that "APEC and CIBAC be proclaimed as party-list winners in the last May 14, 2001 elections, APEC having garnered 5.3654%, and CIBAC having received 2.1317%, of the total votes cast, x x x." (Pp. 1-2; rollo, GR No. 147589, Vol. IV, pp. 3441-3442)

5 Rollo, GR No. 147589, Vol. IV, pp. 3746-3751.

6 En Banc Resolution dated 29 January 2002, pp. 3-4; rollo, GR No. 147589, Vol. IV, pp. 3748-3749.

7 Our enumeration here begins with "10" because, as earlier stated, we have added APEC and CIBAC to the group of seven deemed qualified under the First Compliance Report.

8 We shall not, at this point, rule on the legal effects of this "Resolution" especially insofar as it authorized the proclamation of additional nominees for APEC, AKBAYAN, BUTIL and CIBAC, because a separate Motion challenging it has been lodged in this Court, and the parties are still in the process of submitting their various pleadings thereon.

9 Comment dated November 15, 2002, p. 3; rollo, GR No. 147589, Vol. V, p. 4718. Underscoring in the original.

10 Although the OSG’s Comment averred that the percentages were based on "the total votes cast," a check with the November 6, 2002 Comelec Resolution shows that the basis was the total votes for only 48 parties.

11 Ibid. See also Comelec Resolution dated November 6, 2002, p. 2; rollo, GR No. 147589, Vol. V, p. 4710.

12 Ibid.

13 Comment dated November 25, 2002, p. 2; rollo, GR No. 147589, Vol. V, p. 4801.

14 Ibid. See also Comelec Resolution dated November 6, 2002, p. 2; rollo, GR No. 147589, Vol. V, p. 4710; and footnote 10 of this Resolution.

15 GR Nos. 105111 and 105384, 211 SCRA 297, July 3, 1992.

16 340 Phil. 591, June 19, 1997.

17 Comelec’s First Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, pp. 36-37; GR No. 147613, Vol. I, pp. 4129.

18 Id., pp. 38 & 4131.

19 Supra.

20 The Court postponed its action in regard to the OSG’s recommendation on BUHAY and COCOFED, because at the time the Consolidated Reply was filed, they had not reached the two-percent benchmark required for victory. At that point, there had been no ruling yet on the issue of whether the votes of disqualified participants should be deducted from the "total votes cast." On the other hand, regardless of whether such ballots were to be deducted or not, APEC and CIBAC -- along with BAYAN MUNA, AKBAYAN and BUTIL -- had already obtained more than two percent of all the votes cast for all participants. Hence, there was urgency in ruling upon the qualifications of these five.

21 "SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. – x x x

x x x           x x x          x x x

"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three seats."

22 Supra.

23 Supra.

24 Supra, p. 311, per Bidin, J.

25 Id., p. 312.

26 Supra, p. 501, per Romero, J.

27 Section 6 of RA 6646 provides:

"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."

28 Sunga v. Comelec, 351 Phil. 310, 327, March 25, 1998.

29 Republic v. CA, 359 Phil. 530, 559, November 25, 1998.

30 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 5th ed., 1998, p. 420.

31 Supra, p. 284.

32 In its October 8, 2002 Resolution, the Court reiterated its affirmance of the Compliance Reports when it denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the VFP. It said: "VFP’s Motion for Reconsideration x x x merely rehashes and reiterates arguments already debunked in the July 27, 2001 Comelec Compliance Report, which, to repeat, has been affirmed by this Court. It presents no cogent or compelling reasons why we should reverse or modify our unanimous Resolution affirming the exhaustive Comelec Reports." (P. 4; rollo, GR No. 147613, Vol. V, p. 6932)

33 Initially, Comelec disqualified 120 in its three Compliance Reports but 4 of them -- APEC, BUTIL, BUHAY, and COCOFED -- are now deemed qualified.

34 The figures in this table under "Votes Cast" are from Comelec Canvass Report No. 26 dated September 7, 2001; GR No. 147613, Vol. III, rollo, p. 5961. The percentages are rounded off to two decimal places.

35 Supra, p. 279.

36 Id., pp. 279-280.

37 For a discussion of how to compute additional nominees for parties other than the first, see Veterans, supra, at pp. 280-282. There is no "rounding off" for this portion.

38 n/c refers to "not computed" since, to repeat, the Court is yet to resolve the validity of the proclamation of the additional nominees of APEC, AKBAYAN, BUTIL and CIBAC due to the Motion of BAYAN MUNA to set aside Comelec Resolution No. NBC-02-001 promulgated on November 6, 2002 and the related November 22, 2002 Comelec Order and the November 26, 2002 Comelec Resolution.

39 In our June 26, 2001 Decision, we said that the participation of 154 organizations and parties was approved by Comelec. But a review of Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 dated March 26, 2001 shows that 159 sectoral parties, organizations/coalitions and political parties were allowed to participate during the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. Compare this figure with 162, the number of parties cited in the Comelec Compliance Reports.


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE (DISSENTING) OPINION

VITUG, J.:

The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986 People Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor infused by civilian society in a cleansing political reform and focused itself on institutionalizing civilian participation in daily governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely perpetuation of a single party in power- a convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5, subsection 2, of the 1987 Charter -

THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. -

was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president Corazon C. Aquino, exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seats in the Lower House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women and youth sector. The assignment was made from a selected list of names submitted by the sectors themselves. The sectors would continue to enjoy these reserved seats for the next three terms; thenceforth, they would have to participate in an electoral contest to secure their representation in Congress.

Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait for the legislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress was to be circumscribed by the terms expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2). -First, the system should only apply to the election of 20% of the total composition of the House of Representatives, second, it would prescribe a mandatory proportional representation scheme, and, third, it would allow participating parties and organizations to be represented in voter's registration boards, board of election inspectors, parties and organizations or similar entities.

On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party- List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for COMELEC Resolution No.2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the "Rules and Regulations Governing the Elections of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System." In the May 1998 first party-list elections, the sectors were required, to test, for the first time, their political mettle in an open electoral contest with other parties, groups and organizations under a party-list system. While the elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result of public unawareness of an electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multi-party list elections, however, were different. This time, a huge number of parties, groups and coalitions applied for registration with, and subsequently obtained accreditation from, the COMELEC. Six of these groups were established political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-LABAN.

The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on the ground that their participation does not level the playing field for less known and less organized sectoral groups still in dire need of election logistics and machinery. Arguing that the system is open to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, as well as other parties but only on the condition that the latter field sectoral candidates themselves, herein petitioner sought the disqualification of the large major political parties and groups which do not represent any "genuine" sectoral interest.

A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the Constitution into the electoral system, would show the pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on the qualifications of a party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list system. Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to provide for the system's focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 of R.A. 7941 reads -

"The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lacked well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives, by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions - the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 percentum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise - that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.

The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as possible, abhors the monopoly of representation in the Lower House. This intent is evident in the statutory imposition of the three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the number of seats that may be gained by a party or organization.1 Votes garnered in excess of 6% of the total votes cast do not entitle the party to more than three seats.

There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the enabling law that disallows major political parties from participating in the party-list system and, at the same time, from fielding candidates for legislative district representatives.

Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character of the party-list system. At first glance, it gives the impression of being a combination of proportional representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral representation. The first, proportional representation, on one end, is intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral process for broader participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the other, presupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to be represented. In holding that the party list system is open only to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, the ponencia places much reliance on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:

"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

"The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

"The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election."

It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute, defining a "sectoral party," the enumeration was intended to qualify only "sectoral parties" and not the other eligible groups (e.g., political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The real aim, if the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to introduce the concept of party-list representation.

The party-list system is limited to four groups - 1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominate and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.

A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system is required to register with the COMELEC, together with a list of its five nominees for party-list representatives, arranged according to the group's order of preference. In every election for the House of Representatives, each voter casts two votes - one for the district representative of his choice and another for the party or organization of his choice. The votes cast for the parties and organizations are totaled nationwide. In contrast to the election of all other officials where the rule of plurality (i.e., the candidate with the highest number of votes wins) is adopted, the number of seats under the party-list system depends on the number of votes received in proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis of the number of registered voters in the recent elections, a group under the party-list system, should get approximately half a million votes to be entitled to one seat.

At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties themselves. Undeniably, political parties are an important feature in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control political power, parties add an important element of stability to a political system and also help organize the government and electorate by recruiting candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan attachments and generally educating the public, stimulating voter participation and providing varying degrees of policy direction to government. The idea could also be seen as a good training and recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend the multi-party as allowing the expression and the compromise of the many interests of a complex society, including a range of ideological differences, conflicting political values and philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is explicit - "A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people."2 The multi-party system of proportional representation broadens the composition of the House of Representatives to accommodate sectors and organizations that do not have well-defined political constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or small parties.

A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to legislative districts candidates,3 with the exception of the additional requirement that he be nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any elective office or has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.4 A nominee must actually belong to the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise, there can be no true representation.5 A nominee of the youth sector is further required to be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election.6 Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof.7 Once elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges as do district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the Country-wide Development Fund (CDF).8

A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party can send another person to take his place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party affiliations during his term forfeits his seat.9 So, also, if a person changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or organization.10

The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been overlooked as they precisely were the same points subjected to intense and prolonged deliberations by the members of the Constitutional Commission.

And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains --- "effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it."11 The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing advantages.12 The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when better counsel prevails.

WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their judgment. I am thus constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petitions.


Footnotes

1 Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.

2 Bernas, pp. 355-358.

3 The Constitutional qualifications for legislative districts representatives apply to party-list nominees -

Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, at lest twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.

4 Section 8, R.A. 7941.

5 Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56.

6 Section 9, R.A. 7941.

7 Ibid.

8 See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.

9 Section 15, R.A. 7941.

10 Ibid.

11 Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank 176 US 559, 44 L Ed 587, 20 Sct. 477.

12 People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal 289 St 126, 110 NE 485.


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