Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23752      December 31, 1965

SATURNINO LL. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIANO DE LA CRUZ, respondent.

Lorenzo G. Teves and Associates, Tolentino Law Office and San Juan, Africa and Benedicto for petitioner.
Respondent his own behalf.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for quo warranto seeking the declaration of petitioner as the duly appointed Municipal Judge of Guihulñgan, Negros Oriental.

Petitioner was appointed ad interim Justice of the Peace of Guihulñgan, Negros Oriental, by President Carlos P. Garcia on December 13, 1961. He took his oath of office on December 29, 1961, and on April 27, 1962 his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

From the time he took his oath of office petitioner immediately entered into the discharge of his official functions, but when the new administration took over in 1962, petitioner was advised by the Department of Justice that his appointment as such justice of the peace was included among those recalled in Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal.

Petitioner requested reconsideration contending that his appointment cannot be considered within the ambit of said administrative order, but his request was denied by the Secretary of Justice, and so on February 21, 1962 Pacifico S. Bulado was appointed in his place by virtue of Administrative Order No. 9. Bulado assumed office up to September 15, 1964 when respondent took over as Justice of the Peace of Guihulñgan, Negros Oriental. However, on May 27, 1962, petitioner wrote to Acting Justice of the Peace Bulado requiring him to turnover to him the office he was holding in view of the Commission on Appointments but the request was disregarded by Bulado. And on November 4, 1964, petitioner commenced the present petition for quo warranto.

There is merit in the claim of respondent that the instant action is already barred by the statute of limitations for the reason that more than one year had elapsed since its cause of action arose. Thus, it appears that when petitioner was informed by the Secretary of Justice that his appointment was one of those recalled by President Macapagal to his Administrative Order No. 2 he vacated the same on February 21, 1962 on which date Pacifico S. Bulado was appointed in his place. Since then he ceased to be in office, though he later claimed that his removal was illegal because it does then more than one year had already elapsed. The following authorities uphold this view..

... in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. (Unabia v. City Mayor, et al., 99 Phil. 253, 257; Pinullar v. President of the Senate, L-11667, June 30, 1958; Roque v. President of the Senate, L-10949, July 25, 1958; Madrid v. Auditor General, et al., L-13523, May 31, 1960; Mesias v. Jover, L-8543, November 22, 1955; Abella v. Rodriguez, L-10512, November 29, 1957; Eranda v. Del Rosario, L-10552, April 28, 1958; Quingco v. Rodriguez, L-12144, September 17, 1958; Tabora v. City of Cebu, L-11574, October 31, 1958; De la Cerna v. Osmeña, L-12492, May 23, 1959; Argos v. Veloso, 83 Phil. 929; Tumulak v. Egay, 82 Phil. 828; Bumanglag v. Fernandez, et al., L-11482, November 29, 1960; Cui v. Cui, L-18727. August 31, 1964).

The rationale of this doctrine is that —

... the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person who claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for, the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. (Unabia v. City Mayor, et al., Pinullar v. President of the Senate, supra, Madrid v. Auditor General, et al., supra; Torres v. Quintos, L-3304, April 5, 1951).

The claim of petitioner that the never ceased to discharge the duties of Justice of the Peace of Guihulñgan, Negros Oriental because he informed the Department of Justice that he was not quitting his position because his opinion was that his case was not covered by Administrative Order No. 2 cannot be sustained in the light of what appears in time record of this case. In effect, when petitioner was advised by the Department of Justice that his appointment has been recalled he ceased to act on February 21, 1962 and on that same date Pacifica S. Bulado was appointed in his place. As a matter of fact, on May 27, 1962, petitioner wrote to Bulado requesting him to turn over to him the office he was holding in view of the confirmation of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments, but Bulado denied the request. This letter clearly reveals that Bulado was already then holding the office which he occupied up to September 15, 1964 when respondent took over as the last incumbent of the position. The reason for the rule in limiting the prescriptive period to one year is that it is not proper that the title, to a public office be subjected to continued uncertainty for the people's interest requires that such right be determined as speedily as possible (Tumulak v. Egay, 82 Phil. 828).

WHEREFORE, petition is denied. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.


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